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Introduction
The effects of conflict can be considered a global burden: Conflicts trigger flows of migra-
tion and stir up regional, bilateral and multilateral relations. As such, they impact on the
economies of countries and especially on trade flows between them. The discussion on the
relationship between conflict and trade goes back to Kants perpetual peace (Kant 1795).
The recent resurrection of trade barriers and growing strategic rivalries between major
powers, such as the US and China (The Economist 2019, Brunnermeier et al. 2018), has
put this relationship back on the agenda.
Globalisation has created winners and losers: While winners profit from increased prod-
uct variety (Broda & Weinstein 2006) and improved overall macroeconomic performance
(Dreher 2006), losers suffer from exacerbated income inequality within as well as between
countries (Rodrik 1997, Dreher & Gaston 2008, Dutt & Mukhopadhyay 2005). Trade and
trade policy thus enhance economic performance and development, but can also fuel con-
flicts.
While globally the poor have become richer in the past 35 years, half of the world’s poor
live in conflict-ridden and fragile states (The World Bank 2015). States that have expe-
rienced conflict in the past are more prone to fall into the so-called conflict trap (Collier
et al. 2003, Baranyi et al. 2011) or to experience different conflicts simultaneously (see
Chapter 2). Thus, conflict is an important impediment to development: Besides the
tremendous effects on human life, conflicts have been shown to exacerbate and disrupt
economic growth (see e.g. Nordhaus 2002, Collier 1999, Blomberg & Hess 2002). Conflicts
affect trade domestically by impacting on production and consumption (see e.g. Barro
1996, Chauvin & Rohner 2009), and internationally by impacting on economic agents’ en-
gagement in commerce (see Long 2008, Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003, Guidolin & La Ferrara
2007). Furthermore, declining trade and trade volatility in turn increase relative prices
and dampen real incomes leading to the loss of jobs and opportunities. As a result, people
1
2turn to other sources of income. Especially in conflict-prone fragile states these sources of
income often consist of soldiering or crime (Cal`ı 2014).
International trade and the emergence and persistence of conflicts are thus closely and
endogenously interrelated. Exploring and disentangling this relationship lies at the heart
of my dissertation. I identified four methodological, data, and statistical identification
shortcomings in the research on trade and conflict that will be addressed in the three fol-
lowing chapters. First, data limitations are not accommodated optimally in the literature
on trade and conflict. Second, the predominant part of the literature does not reflect the
reality of conflict types in their analysis. Third, studies on conflict and trade do not ac-
count for country-pair heterogeneity, multilateral trade resistance and heteroscedasticity.
Fourth, the co-founding factors of conflict and trade, development and democracy, and
the indirect simultaneous effects between these four factors, have so far not been accom-
modated in one study.
The analysis of political and economic factors like conflict and trade often relies on cross-
country panel datasets containing information from both disciplines - economics and polit-
ical science (as e.g. seen in Gates et al. 2006, Acemoglu et al. 2019, as well as in Chapters 2
and 3). The construction of these datasets suffers from one specific problem: The naming
of the unit of analysis - i.e. the state or country - is not coded consistently across different
sources (Boehmer et al. 2011). Countries in conflict are especially prone to these coding
discrepancies: Conflicts initiate changes in borders and state names - as e.g. seen in the
separation of Sudan in two states, namely South Sudan and Sudan, in 2006/2007, or the
recent name change of the ”Republic of Macedonia” into ”Republic of North Macedonia”,
which put a 27-years long bilateral dispute to rest. These breaks in nations histories often
lead to inconsistent country coding between data suppliers and in turn lead to a loss of
the information of interest. Thus, merging different datasets is not trivial.
This first shortcoming is addressed in the first chapter of my dissertation, which deals
with data discrepancies and loss of important observations when merging economic and
political science variables into one dataset. It discusses the implications of inconsistencies
in the coding of country names between different datasets on trade, conflicts, and democ-
ratization. The paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, it shows
that the problem of inconsistent country coding remains despite standardization efforts
3in country codes (such as the commonly used ISO-codes) and despite the development of
software packages that facilitate the comparison of country codings. Second, it provides
evidence that neglecting these inconsistencies leads to high numbers of missing values
in the final datasets. This might in turn lead to biased statistical inference. Lastly, it
provides detailed overview tables for all datasets analyzed containing information on the
most profound discrepancies. The paper is joint work with Vanessa A. Boese. Vanessa
conducted the analysis of the democracy datasets, while I analyzed the trade data. The
work on the conflict data and the writing of the paper was shared equally. The final
version of this paper is published in the Economics of Peace and Security Journal Volume
14, Number 1 (April 2019).1
The second chapter of my dissertation accommodates the second and third shortcoming
of the literature. Until the early 2000’s research operationalized conflict as interstate dis-
putes, as data for conflicts between states were more widely available than data on other
forms of violence. This data availability problem has persistently lead to a blindspot in the
analysis of the developments of the past 60 years: The occurrence of interstate disputes
has declined, while other forms of conflicts, such as internal conflicts and internationalized
internal conflicts, increased in number and severity (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.3). At
the same time, the growing importance of world trade in the 1980’s has led researchers
to examine the question of its impediments and drivers (as e.g. Ray 1981, Grieco 1990,
Copeland 1990). While a lot has been written on determinants of trade such as geo-
graphic distance, borders, and currency unions (see e.g. Anderson & Van Wincoop 2003,
Rose 2004), the role of different forms of conflict as trade barriers has remained poorly
examined.
This is where the second paper of my dissertation ties in. It analyzes the impact of dif-
ferent conflict types and their distinct peculiarities on international trade. The paper
contributes in two ways to the literature: First, it uses detailed data on five different con-
flict types which reflect contemporaneous conflict reality. This allows for a more detailed
analysis of conflicts impact on trade. Second, to overcome the simultaneity bias inherent
in the relationship of conflict and trade and to control for unobserved heterogeneity on the
country as well as on the country-pair level, this paper uses a poisson pseudo maximum
likelihood approach for panel datasets. The paper is a single authored paper.
1See https://www.epsjournal.org.uk/index.php/EPSJ/article/view/310.
4The fourth shortcoming is being addressed by the third chapter of my dissertation. A large
literature considers additional determinants of either trade and conflict and the endoge-
neous bilateral or multilateral relationships between them (e.g. Frankel & Romer 1999,
Miguel et al. 2004, Acemoglu et al. 2019, Rodrik et al. 2004). These studies have shown
that the four factors trade, conflict, development and democracy are closely interrelated
and impact on each other. However, former research often falls short of using adequate
data and econometric approaches to model these indirect and simultaneous effects between
the four factors. With the reemergence of protectionism and erosion of democracy seen
in many western countries, the question of how shocks in one of these factors translate to
response reactions by the other factors gained renewed importance.
In the third chapter, a country-specific vector autoregressive model is employed, which
allows for endogenous dynamic interactions between trade, democracy, development and
conflict. Three contributions of this paper to the literature are made: First, adequate
data on democracy and conflict is used to overcome mismeasurement problems seen in
former papers. Second, the model allows for indirect as well as simultaneous effects be-
tween the four factors such that the direction of effects for each bilateral relationship
can be examined. Third, a country-level analysis is intentionally chosen to account for
country-heterogeneity, which is often covered up by the use of panel estimators which as-
sume homogeneous slope parameters. The paper is joint work with Vanessa A. Boese. We
developed the research idea and question together, and iterated on the initial and the final
writing of the paper. Vanessa implemented the final calculations of the impulse response
functions in EViews and Stata and I proceeded with the interpretation of the results. All
remaining work, i.e. compiling of data, initial estimations in Stata and working through
the vector autoregressive model, was shared equally.
The quintessence of my dissertation is threefold: First, data choice and processing are
often neglected crucial factors of influence for results obtained by statistical and econo-
metric analysis. Second, heterogeneity across countries needs to be allowed for in order
to understand the mechanisms behind economic and political determinants such as trade
and conflict. Third, dynamic interactions as well as indirect effects between these deter-
minants need to be accounted for to understand the extensive interdependence between
them. Thus, future research plans are to examine the trade of specific commodities in
5the framework of different conflict types, to analyse the role of single conflict types in a
dynamic vector autoregressive setting and to extend the monadic approach used in chap-
ter 3 to a dyadic vector auto-regressive model allowing for an estimation with the gravity
equation.
Chapter 1
’Tis but thy name that is my
enemy: On the construction of
macro panel datasets in conflict
and peace economics
together with Vanessa A. Boese1
Abstract
The empirical analysis of datasets covering a large number of countries and time periods has
become an integral part of conflict and peace economics. As such, numerous studies examine
relationships between and among macroeconomic, political, and conflict variables and this often
involves the merging of disparate datasets to combine relevant variables for which the country
unit of analysis, however, is not necessarily the same. This article highlights difficulties in the
data merging process and, by way of example, presents detailed country coding unit comparison
for two economic (UN Comtrade and World Development Indicators), two democracy (Polity IV
and V-Dem), and two conflict datasets (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and COW Milita-
rized Interstate Disputes Dataset). We find that merging datasets can result in the elimination of
very large numbers of observations due to unmergeable records and that dropped observations of-
ten include the very countries or territorial entities most of interest in conflict and peace economics.
JEL codes: F140, N400
1The authors would like to thank Scott Gates and Philipp Großkurth for excellent comments and
suggestions. All errors are our own. Authors are listed alphabetically. All work was shared equally.
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CHAPTER 1. ’TIS BUT THY NAME THAT IS MY ENEMY 7
1.1 What’s in a name?
In conflict and peace economics, the construction of large panel datasets nowadays forms
the basis for the majority of empirical cross-country studies. Originating from different
sources, such panel datasets contain measures on variables such as international trade,
economic growth, GDP, armed conflict, democratization, and government effectiveness.2
But bringing these variables together, that is merging them into a single dataset, hinges
on the exact identification of the country unit under study. To permit reasonable sta-
tistical inference, the country unit for which, for example, the trade value is calculated,
should respond to the same entity for which all other variables in the dataset are coded.
Unfortunately, the names, and even the physical borders, with which countries are coded
vary considerably across different data sources.3
At the core of the coding differences lies the question “What’s in a (country) name”? We
argue that there are two complementary parts to the answer. The first regards the entity
under observation, the unit of analysis: What is a country? The answer depends on the
research framework. For example, the purpose of the Russett et al. (1968) state list as
well as of the original Gleditsch & Ward (1999) state list was to capture recognized states
in the international system. This particular definition of a country is of utmost relevance
in analyses of authority structures. Nevertheless, one cannot blindly assume that the
unit of analysis, that is, the country, is defined along the same criteria in economic or
political datasets. Unfortunately, the burden of comparing the unit of analysis underlying
different macro panel datasets lies with the scholar(s) attempting to merge them. As a
consequence, we emphasize the importance of discussing the merging process in empirical
studies in conflict and peace economics.
The second part to the “What’s in a (country) name?” question concerns the entity’s label:
Numerous scholars have presented ways to adjust for differences in country labels. For
example, Hensel (2001) provides a thorough list of alternative historical state names and
Heather Ba has created Stata files allowing for the mapping of country names, Correlates
2Examples of studies using such merged datasets include Hegre et al. (2001), Blomberg & Hess (2006),
Gates et al. (2006), Martin et al. (2008), Glick & Taylor (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2019), Dunne & Tian
(2015), and d’Agostino et al. (2018).
3Hence the title of this article. ‘Tis but they name that is my enemy (Act II, Scene ii, Shakespeare,
2003).
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of War (COW) codes, and World Bank codes.4
That inconsistent country names across different data sources pose a problem is widely
known among scholars working with macro panel datasets. Major attempts to standardize
worldwide country coding already were undertaken half a century ago by Russett et al.
(1968) and almost twenty years ago by Gleditsch & Ward (1999). Nevertheless, several
problems remain unresolved and, unfortunately—with the emergence of readily available
software packages and codes—a discussion of “what is the (country) unit of analysis” has
become almost unfashionable. In spite of its tediousness and complexity, the country
merging process is generally not discussed in academic papers (or in their supplementary
materials).
The contribution of this article is hence twofold: First and foremost, it shows that in
spite of all country coding scheme standardization efforts and relevant software packages
or codes, the problem of inconsistent country coding in macro panel datasets persist. We
therefore want to re-raise awareness of this problem and encourage a discussion of it in
empirical cross-country studies in conflict and peace economics. Second, by way of illus-
tration, in the Appendix to this article we provide overview tables of some of the gravest
discrepancies in country coding across datasets which facilitate quick cross-dataset com-
parisons of country units.
1.1.1 Typology of inconsistencies
A typology of inconsistencies Inconsistent country names are the tip of the merging ice-
berg. Not only do names differ, but so does for example the period of existence for some
countries. And worse, the documentation on the country coding schemes provided by the
data projects is often sparse and contains errors.5
The following three types of inconsistencies between country units in different data sources
and coding schemes are frequently observed and examined in this article:
1. A state name exists in one dataset but not in the other
(i) Reason: Different years (time series do not match and some states do not exist
4See http://heatherba.web.unc.edu/data-code/.
5For discussion, see the sections on democracy, economic, and conflict data in this article.
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anymore/yet).
• Example: When merging PolityIV with Comtrade data the Orange Free
State cannot be merged as it ceases to exist before coding of Comtrade
Data starts)
• Result: Country is unmergeable and drops out because it does not exist in
one dataset
(ii) Reason: Different definition of statehood
• Example: Some datasets do not code Palestine as they do not consider it
to meet formal requirements of statehood
• Result: Country is unmergeable and drops out because it does not exist in
one dataset
(iii) Reason: Different state names (labels) or entities/territories (see inconsistency
3 described below)
• Example: Yugoslavia and its successors are coded vastly different in terms
of names and years across all datasets. How should these countries/observations
be aggregated to make them comparable across datasets and to not loose
conflict observations?
• Result: Country may drop out if no action is taken
2. A country is coded under the same name, but for different years in two datasets
(time series for given country are not identical in both datasets)
(i) Reason: Missing observations within time series
• Example: In V-Dem Germany, 1946-48, is not coded since the institutional
framework of Germany during those years does not meet the formal criteria
for the definition of their democracy indices
• Solution: Depends on application and on underlying assumptions made
about reason for missingness, possibly interpolation
(ii) Reason: Country starts or ceases to exist and first/last year is not coded con-
sistently across datasets
• Example: PolityIV codes former East Germany between 1945-1990 whereas
V-Dem codes it from 1949-1990.
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• Solution: Depends on application, possibly extrapolation
3. A country is coded under different names:
3A: For the same years in two datasets
3B: For different years in two datasets
(i) Reason: It is clearly the same state only the label is different. This is often the
case for 3A - or for 3B in combination with inconsistency type 2, reason (ii).
• Example: “St.” vs. “Saint” or official vs. colloquial state names (“Pluri-
national State of Bolivia” and “Bolivia”)
• Solution: Use relevant Stata and R packages for renaming
(ii) Reason: The different names might refer to different underlying entities/ terri-
tories
• Example: We provide detailed overviews of these cases in Table 10 (Democ-
racy Datasets) and Table 14 (Economic Datasets) of the Appendix.
• Solution: The option 3B case is by far the most difficult case as the years do
not provide additional evidence on the actual entity captured. The question
of how these entities could be compared in a meaningful way across datasets
has no straightforward answer, rather the answer is case dependent.
Inconsistent country coding of types 1 to 3 lead to missing values in the final, merged
dataset.6 In this article we show that the extent of these “missing values” (they are not
really missing, just missing due to inconsistencies) is vast and of particular relevance to
empirical research in conflict and peace economics. Most country coding schemes differ
in the naming and dating of a specific set of countries: Countries which have experienced
armed conflict are less democratic and less trade open than the consistently coded ones.
As a result, a merged dataset can contain a comparatively high share of missing values for
this set of countries. Thus, it can no longer be considered a random sample. To minimize
“missings,” and to avoid losing valuable information, the process of creating large panel
6Note the difference between missing values and missing observations. For example, on the one hand,
in the V-Dem dataset version 8 there are no observations for Germany between 1945 and 1948, leaving
the panel unbalanced. In the World Development Indicators, on the other hand, the panel provided is
balanced, that is, there is one observation for each country in each year. However, for a number of years
the variable of interest contains a missing value. Ultimately, when merging two such sources and using the
final dataset for statistical analysis, missing values and missing observations come down to the same thing:
missing information. For most regressions or other analyses, software like Stata disregards observations
whenever they contain missing values.
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datasets should therefore be done with utmost care.
In general, there are three approaches to code countries in macro panel data: By (string)
country names, by numeric code, or by alphabetic code. The most common schemes in-
clude (but are not limited to) the COW country list, the Gleditsch/Ward state list, and the
ISO 3166 list of country codes.7 In theory, numeric and alphabetic codes should facilitate
the merging process. Unfortunately, several numeric and alphabetic codes schemes exist
and often they are neither implemented consistently nor are the country codes easily trans-
latable to each other. In R the package “countrycode” and in Stata the package “kountry”
help with these issues.8 These packages map country names and codes from one kind of
macro country codes to another. They come with a slight disadvantage, though, as “[t]he
mapping between the available dataset names [types of country coding schemes] is not
always perfect.”9 This is especially dire when using a comparatively new dataset such as
V-Dem which does not follow any of the coded country schemes exactly. In addition, this
assumes that each source dataset correctly applies the country coding scheme it is based
on. In the following sections we show that this is not the case for several datasets. By
letting Stata or R packages adjust the country names, the renaming—and subsequently
the merging process—is put into a black box, inherently making it more vulnerable to
mistakes.
We aim to take this data merging process out of its black box and use actual country
names to prevent merging mistakes. In what follows we provide a detailed comparison
of six datasets covering the indicators trade, democracy, and conflict. For each dataset a
table with actual country names and years in the data is provided (see Boese & Kamin
2018a,b). These tables present an overview of the gravest discrepancies in country coding
and allow for quick cross-dataset comparisons of country units. In addition, this article
gives an overview of the extent of the country coding problem by comparing structural
properties of the set of inconsistently coded countries to those of the uniformly coded ones
7COW: A country coding scheme employed by several of the macro panel datasets studied in this article.
Data can be obtained from http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cowcountry-codes. There are
three variables: Numeric and alphabetic country codes and statename. The dataset covers 217 countries.
The country list includes 26 duplicate observations. Gleditsch/Ward: The Gleditsch & Ward (1999) state
list builds on and revises the COW country list. First published in 1999, a current version is available at
http://ksgleditsch.com/statelist.html. ISO: See https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.
html.
8R: See https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/countrycode/countrycode.pdf. Stata: See
Raciborski (2008).
9Quote: Raciborski 2008, p. 392. Raciborski (2008) continues with a short overview of the most striking
inconsistencies.
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and by discussing missing data as well as differences in annual coding.
On the one hand, this article provides assistance to scholars merging several source
datasets. On the other, it highlights naming inconsistencies between data documentation,
such as code books, and actual observations in the data. Such inconsistencies potentially
lead to merging problems when blindly using the Stata or R packages (and the country
coding scheme specified in the documentation) discussed above. We have the highest re-
spect for all the data projects discussed in this article. We therefore hope that the lists of
these inconsistencies are also of assistance to the data projects in aligning their documen-
tation to their respective datasets.
The following three sections respectively provide thorough comparisons of two democracy,
two trade, and two conflict datasets, including detailed tables comparing the country cod-
ing units. The article closes with a discussion of the results.
1.2 Democracy Data
This section compares the country coding units of two democracy datasets: V-Dem version
8 and the PolityIV dataset 2016. The tables referenced in this section can be found in
the Appendix as well as in Boese & Kamin (2018a). We first discuss the countries listed
in V-Dem version 8, then discuss the countries in the PolityIV dataset 2016, and then
compare characteristics of the observations listed in both datasets with those listed in
only one of the datasets.
1.2.1 V-Dem Data Version 8
The V-Dem dataset used for this article is V-Dem data version 8, in country year for-
mat. The variable of interest is the Electoral Democracy Index, v2x polyarchy. V-Dem
identifies the countries either by name, alphabetical country id, or numerical country id.10
These country identifiers do not correspond to any of the prevailing country schemes im-
plemented in the Stata or R packages mentioned above. To facilitate the merging process,
we therefore provide a detailed list of county coding units in the data11 and compare it to
10Alphabetical country text id: “Abbreviated country names”. Numerical country id: “Unique country
ID designated for each country. A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset
can be found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the V-Dem Country Coding Units
document”.
11See Boese & Kamin (2018a), worksheet “V-Dem Codebook vs. Data”.
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the country list in the V-Dem code book (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaan-
ing, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish et al. 2018, p. 36).
V-Dem excels in terms of transparency and provides a supplementary article on “V-Dem
Country Coding Units v8” which lists and discusses all polities and countries and the
respective years for which they are coded as well as a detailed explanation of the country
borders used in the coding.12 It also provides detailed information on years in which a
country is not coded (with the variables gapstart and gapend). However, there are sev-
eral observations for which v2x polyarchy is missing. Worksheet “Overview” in Boese &
Kamin (2018a) shows the number of years for which each country is coded in V-Dem
version 8, as well as its gaps (by coding decision) and its additional missing values.
For ten countries the names in dataset and documentation do not match.13 These name
mismatches are by no means a purely alphabetical problem. Take, for example, Vietnam.
While there is no country named Vietnam, North or South, in the V-Dem dataset there
is a “Republic of Vietnam” (coded from 1802–1975) and a “Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam” (coded from 1945–2017). The V-Dem Country Coding Units document, however,
provides a detailed overview of the polities forming part of:
”Vietnam, South (35) Coded: 1802–1975. History: (...) Republic of Vietnam (also known
as South Vietnam) (1955–1975).” and ”Vietnam, North (34) Coded: 1945– History: Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam (i.e. North Vietnam) [declared] (1945); Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (1945–1949); Democratic Republic of Vietnam [independent state] (1949– ).
Note: From 1976, the polity also includes areas formerly belonging to Republic of Vietnam
(South Vietnam).”14
Take another example. In the documentation the numerical country id (365) is coded
for two countries: Oldenburg, 1789–1867, and Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, 1809–1867. In the
dataset, however, only Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach is assigned country id 365 while Oldenburg
is assigned code 364.
12See Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Ciobanu & Olin (2018).
13They are: Democratic Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, German Democratic
Republic, Mecklenburg Schwerin, North Korea, Republic of Vietnam, Republic of the Congo, South Korea,
Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe, and Timor-Leste.
14V-Dem Country Coding Units, p. 27.
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1.2.2 Polity IV
A second dataset, capturing political authority patterns worldwide and over long peri-
ods of time, is the PolityIV project’s dataset on “Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800–2016” (for short, the PolityIV dataset).15 In the dataset countries are
identified by their name, an alphabetic country code, or a numeric code.16 These identi-
fiers supposedly follow the COW country coding scheme.17 Table 1.1 displays the results
from merging the PolityIV data with the COW country list, finding that 13 percent of
the countries are unmergeable when merging by country name, 6 percent when merging
by numeric code, and 10 percent when merging by alphabetic code.18 The unmergeable
groups largely consist of countries of particular interest in conflict and peace economics
such as the Koreas, Congos, Germanies, and Serbias. As a consequence, when merging the
PolityIV data using a software package taking the dataset to be in “COW coding scheme”
these countries may not be properly dealt with.
Table 1.1: Number of (un)mergeable countries (PolityIV/COW country list
Merging by Country Numeric Alphabetic
name code code
Unmergeable countries in PolityIV 26 11 19
Mergeable countries in PolityIV & COW 169 183 177
Number of (un)mergeable countries in a merge of the PolityIV Dataset with the COW
country list
It is worth noting that country names and alphabetic and numeric codes are not coded
consistently over time within the PolityIV dataset, i.e., there are 195 different country
names, but only 194 different alphabetic and numeric codes. This is not due to a single
country having different names and only one code, but to a number of countries and several
code/label constellations. Examples include Yugoslavia (either ccode 345 and scode YUG
or ccode 347 and scode YGS; that 347 and YGS also are used for Serbia and Montenegro
15See Marshall et al. (2017b).
16Alphabetic: The variable scode (“Alpha Country Code: Each country in the Polity IV dataset is
defined by a three-letter alpha code, derived from the Correlates of War’s listing of members of the
interstate system” (Marshall et al. 2017a, p. 12). Numeric: ccode (numerical, “Numeric Country Code:
Each country in the Polity IV dataset is defined by a three-digit numeric code, derived from the Correlates
of War’s listing of members of the interstate system” (Marshall et al. 2017a, p. 11).
17Supposedly: See (Marshall et al. 2017a, p. 11)
18To be clear, the share of unmergeable countries is calculated as: Number of unmergeable countries/
total number of countries in PolityIV (i.e., 26/195 ≈ 13.3%, 11/194 ≈ 5.7%, and 19/194 ≈ 9.8%. Note
that the rows are labeled correctly although one could in fact omit “and COW” from the second row since,
if countries are mergeable in a merge between COW and PolityIV, they must exist in both datasets. In
the first row, however, are unmergeable countries only, i.e., those which exist only in the PolityIV dataset.
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in the dataset further complicates matters), Ethiopia (either ccode 529 and scode ETI or
ccode 530 and scode ETH), Pakistan (either ccode 769 and scode PKS or ccode 770 and
scode PAK). Further, ccode 860 and scode ETM is used for East Timor and Timor Leste,
and ccode 255 and scode GMY is used for Germany and Prussia.
Additionally, in the PolityIV dataset we note duplicate observations for Yugoslavia in 1991
and for Ethiopia in 1993. This further complicates the merging process as the scholar is
forced to decide how to proceed with the duplicates.
1.2.3 Comparison of the democracy data
Table 1.2 describes both democracy datasets. The variable of interest in each dataset
is a democracy index: v2x polyarchy for the V-Dem data and polity2 for the PolityIV
data.19 The total number of nonmissing observations refers to the number of observations
for which the respective variable of interest contains nonmissing values.
When merging the datasets by country name and year, observations of inconsistency types
1 to 3 cannot be merged. Table 1.3 shows the number of mergeable and unmergeable ob-
servations by source dataset. As discussed, even though an observation might be listed,
the variable of interest can contain a missing value. Hence the lower half of Table 1.3
proves the same information for all observations with nonmissing values. To make the
number of observations comparable across datasets in Table 1.3, only observations from
the time period covered by both datasets are considered (that is, V-Dem observations be-
fore 1800 as well as the year 2017 were left out to match the PolityIV time series). Around
41 percent of the V-Dem and around 9 percent of the PolityIV observations cannot be
merged. To assess whether the unmergeable observations are systematically different from
the mergeable ones we calculated the average levels of democracy for each group. Table
19V-Dem’s v2x polyarchy: Range 0 to 1 (most democratic). PolityIV’s polity2: Range –10 to +10 (most
democratic).
Table 1.2: Description of democracy datasets
Dataset A: V-Dem B: PolityIV
total number of observations 26,537 17,228
total number of nonmissing observations 24,115 16,992
number of countries 201 195
number of years 1789-2017 1800-2016
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Table 1.3: Merging V-Dem and PolityIV data
Merging A: V-Dem B: PolityIV
unmergeable observations only in A 10,929 -
unmergeable observations only in B - 1,619
mergable observations in both: 15,609
non-missing observations only in A 9,380 -
non-missing observations only in B - 1,571
non-missing mergeable observations in both: 14,736 15,421
4 shows the results of two t-tests, one for V-Dem, one for PolityIV. In both datasets, the
unmergeable group had a significantly lower average level of democracy (To be clear, the
t-tests were carried out only on the nonmissing observations noted in Table 1.3).
1.3 Economic data
UN Comtrade20 and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)21 contain
economic data. We first discuss the countries listed in the UN Comtrade data, then those
in the WDI, and then compare the country coding schemes of both datasets. The tables
and worksheets referenced to in this section can be found in the Appendix as well as in
Boese & Kamin (2018b).
1.3.1 UN Comtrade
The indicator taken from UN Comtrade is total exports in current U.S. dollars from each
country to the rest of the world. The Comtrade dataset is an unbalanced panel as it only
contains years for which countries have reported trade. Hence, time series differ from
country to country. The first year for which some countries reported trade is 1962, the
20See United Nations Comtrade Database (2018).
21See World Development Indicators (2017a).
Table 1.4: Two sample ttests of average level of democracy (v2x polyarchy/PolityIV)
Dataset: A: V-Dem B: PolityIV
average level of democracy unmergeable group 0.1377 -0.4495
average level of democracy mergeable group 0.3428 -1.5493
difference in average democracy levels between groups 0.2051 *** 1.0998 ***
Two sample ttests of average level of democracy. Democracy variable V-Dem:
v2x polyarchy, range: 0 (most autocratic) to 1 (most democratic). Democracy variable
PolityIV: polity2, range: -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic).
Note: *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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last year is 2017 (few observations are available for the start and end years of the time
series). Comtrade offers data coded according to two different systems for international
trade statistics: The Harmonized System (HS), introduced in 1988, and the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC), introduced in 1962, with the latter being less
detailed than the former. To obtain the longest possible time series, we concatenated SITC
classification export data, 1962–1987, with HS classification export data, 1988–2017.
In addition to gaps in the time series caused by missing observations (as discussed above)
the export variable contains missing values for several observations. Missing information
primarily indicates that trade was not reported and is not to be equated with zero trade
flows.22 This is crucial concerning the tackling of zero trade flows and appropriate model
choice.23
The country name abbreviations of the official UN country list24 correspond to the coun-
try names used in the Comtrade data with the exception of Coˆte d’Ivoire and Re´union,
which contain spelling errors in the downloaded Comtrade dataset (“C%Yte d’Ivoire” and
“R% c©union”).
1.3.2 World Development Indicators
The economic indicator taken from the World Bank’s WDI is trade openness, defined as
the percentage share of trade of each country’s GDP, that is, (imports+exports)/GDP.
Starting in 1960, the time series runs to 2016. The distinction between zero trade and
missing data in the WDI is equivalent to the one in UN Comtrade. In contrast to Com-
trade, however, the WDI data is a balanced panel with one observation for each country
and year. Nevertheless, trade openness contains missing values for several observations
due to missing information on GDP, exports, or imports. In addition to countries, WDI
provides aggregated information on country groups (such as “Europe & Central Asia” or
“Low & Middle Income”). These where taken out of the list to facilitate reading (the
full list of country groups removed is available in Boese and Kamin, 2018b, worksheet
“Disregarded Country Groups”).
22For a discussion of missings in trade data see, for example, Keshk et al. (2010), Section 3.3, p. 10,
Barbieri et al. (2009), p. 476, and Boehmer et al. (2011).
23See, for example, Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006).
24The UN provides a list of country codes and names at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/50377/Comtrade-Country-Code-and-Name.
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To our knowledge, the World Bank does not provide an explicit country coding scheme
upon which WDI data are based. However, the World Bank does provide a list of countries
upon which the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data are based.25 It is unclear
whether this list also forms the basis of the WDI dataset. Of 15,048 observations in the
WDI dataset used in this article, 30 percent (4,560 observations) do not match the WITS
list. Several of them are due to naming inconsistencies such as, for example, “Bahamas,
The” versus “Bahamas”.
1.3.3 Comparing the economic data
In a comparison of the economic datasets26 the sheer number of naming inconsistencies27
and single appearances of countries (that is, they appear in one, but not in the other
dataset)28 stands out. Additional cases, difficult to handle when merging datasets, are
countries that started and ceased to exist, yielding different country names for different
or the same territories and for different years (inconsistency type 3). While WDI refers
to each country under one name continuously for the entire time series, this is not the
case for the UN Comtrade data. In Comtrade, countries are coded by different names and
years. Table 1429 displays the cases where this kind of inconsistency is in place. The table
shows that Comtrade distinguishes the underlying country entities in much more detail.
There is, for example, only one “Germany” in the WDI data as opposed to “Germany”,
“Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany” and “Fmr Dem. Rep. of Germany” in the UN Comtrade
data.
Assuming that the ending of one state and the beginning of a new one are coded in
detail through the year variable by WDI, can the country coding units be supposed to
be the same across the two datasets? The sparsity of country coding unit documenta-
tion renders it impossible to answer this question. There is no information on whether
territories changed, and on whether or how much this change was incorporated in the
coding. This becomes a severe drawback to the data when complementary variables for
the analysis of trade flows, such as country size, GDP, measures of distance and—most
importantly—borders are taken into account.30
25https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/content/codes/country codes.htm.
26See Boese & Kamin (2018b), worksheet “Overview”.
27See Table 11 or Boese & Kamin (2018b), worksheet “naming inconsistencies” for inconsistency type 3,
reason (i) (one country coded with different names but for the same year and years).
28See Tables 12 and 13 or Boese & Kamin (2018b), worksheet “existence asymmetry” for inconsistency
types 1 and 3.
29Also see Boese & Kamin (2018b), worksheet “inconsistency type 3”.
30Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003), for example, demonstrated that national borders are a highly
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The case of Sudan (see Table 14)31 illustrates the problem: WDI codes “South Sudan”
and “Sudan”. For the latter, the measure of trade openness is available for the whole
time series (1960–2016). For “South Sudan”, the indicator is available from 2008–2015.
UN Comtrade codes “Sudan” (2012–2015) and “Former Sudan” (1963–2011, with gaps).
Hence, WDI takes 2008 as the year of birth for “South Sudan”, while Comtrade (implicitly,
because it does not code “South Sudan” as a country)32 codes a new state “Sudan” from
2012 onward. Similar cases are Serbia (with or without data for Kosovo or Montenegro)
and China (with or without data for Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan).33
The country name by itself does not allow for an exact indication of the territory coded.
In a statistical analysis only of trade, it might not matter whether Sudan or South Sudan
is included. In conflict and peace economics, however, where relationships among conflict,
politics, and economics are of high interest, such lack of accuracy effectively becomes an
impediment to an appropriate econometric analysis.
Table 1.5: Description of trade datasets.
Dataset A: Comtrade B: WDI
total number of observations 12,768 15,048
total number of nonmissing observations* 6,790 10,643
number of countries 228 264
number of years 1962-2017 1960-2016
Note: *The total number of nonmissing observations refers to the number of observations
for which the respective variable of interest contains nonmissing values.
Table 1.5 describes both trade datasets. For Comtrade, the variable of interest is total
exports in current U.S. dollars (TradeValueUS); for the WDI data, it is trade openness as
a percentage of GDP (tradeop).
Table 1.6 shows the number of mergeable and unmergeable observations by source dataset.
As discussed, even though an observation might be listed the variable of interest can con-
tain a missing value. Hence the bottom half of Table 1.6 provides the same information
for all observations with nonmissing values. To make the number of observations compa-
important impediment to trade.
31Boese & Kamin (2018b), worksheet “inconsistency 2.0”, rows 36–38.
32The fact that no “South Sudan” is included in the UN Comtrade data is itself somewhat astonishing
since trade data is available (otherwise WDI would not be able to code it).
33See World Development Indicators (2017b), p. XVII.
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Table 1.6: Merging Comtrade and WDI data
Merging A: Comtrade B: WDI
unmergeable* observations only in A 3,803 -
unmergeable observations only in B - 6,083
mergable observations in both: 8,965
non-missing observations only in A 1,449 -
non-missing observations only in B - 3,765
non-missing mergeable observations in both 5,341 6,878
Note: *When merging both datasets by country name and year those observations of
inconsistency types 1-3 are unmergeable.
rable across datasets in Table 1.6 only observations from the time period covered by both
datasets are considered, i.e., 1962–2016. About 30 percent of the Comtrade observations,
and about 40 percent of the WDI observations, cannot be merged.34 To assess whether
the unmergeable observations are systematically different from the mergeable ones, we cal-
culated average levels of total exports and trade openness for each group. Table 1.7 shows
the results of two sample t-tests: For Comtrade, the average export level is statistically
significantly higher (given the exponent) in the unmergeable than in the mergeable group.
For WDI, the unmergeable country group had a significantly lower level of average trade
openness.
Table 1.7: Two sample ttests of average level of trade and trade openness (Comtrade/WDI)
Dataset: A: Comtrade B: WDI
average level of trade variable unmergeable group 2.72 · 1014 66.16
average level of trade variable mergeable group 3.98 · 1013 76.14
difference in average total export & −2.32·1014*** 9.98***
trade openness levels btwn both groups
Trade variable Comtrade: total exports, TradeValueUS, range: US$ 37, 310 to US$ 2.34 ·
1016. Trade variable WDI: trade openness, tradeop, range: 0 to 860,8 (in %)
Looking at the naming inconsistencies (Table 11) confirms this “higher-lower” difference:
The high levels of export values in the unmergeable group in Table 1.7 are driven by ob-
servations from the U.S., Germany, Macao, and Hong Kong.35 Table 1.7 hence provides a
good intuition to the effects of inconsistent country coding: Either the cases of high export
levels or of low trade openness are lost due to merging problems. Either one is problematic
in terms of statistics and, depending on the analytic aim, might lead to biased estimates.
34Again, to be clear: 3, 803/(3, 803 + 8, 965) ≈ 29.7% and 6, 083/(6, 083 + 8, 965) ≈ 40.4%.
35This is shown in Boese & Kamin (2018b), worksheet “Unmergeable Outliers Comtrade”. It contains
all unmergeable Comtrade observations sorted by export values
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1.4 Conflict data
In theory, the datasets for economic and political variables code each variable for all years
during which a country exists. The conflict datasets, however, are fundamentally different:
By design, they only code conflict variables for years in which a conflict occurred in a given
country and which surpassed some conflict criteria (for example, 25 battle-related deaths).
Consequently, time series and cross-section data dimensions contain gaps for country-years
without armed conflict.
The UCDP Armed Conflict dataset version 18.1 (Pettersson & Eck 2018a, Gleditsch et al.
2002, UCDP Battle-Related Deaths dataset version 18.1 n.d.) studies armed conflict above
a yearly threshold of 25 battlerelated deaths. The Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) B
dataset version 4.2 (Palmer et al. 2015) captures militarized interstate disputes which can
involve, for example, a display of force without incurring any battle deaths. Therefore, the
gaps in the datasets will be very different, and merging them by country and years coded
does not provide insights on, or a comparison of, country coding units. Nevertheless, both
datasets acknowledge the importance of defining country coding units. In the remainder
of this section, we show that even within each of these datasets there are inconsistencies
between the country coding units as defined by the respective data project and the actual
observations in the data. As a result, these observations are either dropped, potentially
falsely matched, or have to be manually adjusted when using Stata or R commands for
merging countries.
1.4.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset version 18.1
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset acknowledges the importance of a precise de-
scription of country coding units36 and dedicates an entire section of its code book37 to
the exact definition of country coding units. It includes a country table with numerical
and alphabetical country codes, state names, and start and end years for the countries
that form part of the international system of states. Tables 15 to 19 list the countries
coded in the actual data and compares them to the system membership table from the
36“The definition of a state is crucial to the UCDP/PRIO conflict list” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset Codebook, 2018, p.13).
37See Section 4: “System Membership Description” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook,
Themne´r (2018), p. 13).
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UCDP/PRIO code book. The system membership table must include more observations
since, by definition, it also includes countries without armed conflict. But Tables 15 to 19
show that even when restricted to countries with armed conflict there are inconsistencies
in the country names (for example “Burkina Faso” and “Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)”,
“DR Congo (Zaire)” and “Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire)”, and “Ivory Coast”
and “Cote D’Ivoire”).
1.4.2 MID B version 4.2
The MID B version 4.2 dataset includes one observation per participant to a militarized
dispute, 1816 –2010, with countries taken from the Correlates of War (COW) list. The
MID B dataset itself does not contain (string) state names. Instead, countries are coded
with a three-digit numerical code (ccode) and with an alphabetical code (stabb). Before
joining variables from the MID B dataset with any other macro panel data, such as WDI,
a first step therefore is to merge MID B with COW, but four countries cannot in fact be
merged (Table 1.8. The three-digit alphabetic codes for these countries are RUM, USR,
VTM, and ZAI.
This is a perfect example of the difficulties associated with merging by country as it is
hardly possible to determine with certainty which underlying entity (territory) is exactly
covered, for example, by USR or VTM. This also illustrates why, for this article, we chose
to employ merging by country (string) names, not codes. VTM could stand for (Demo-
cratic) Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam North, Vietnam South, or Vietnam. While the
exact entity coded remains unclear, it is very clear that this case contains information
relevant for studies of conflict.
That the MID B dataset states that it follows the COW country list convention when in
fact it does not, makes it effectively impossible to determine for some observations which
actual underlying entity is considered a country during which period of time.
Table 1.8: Number of (un)mergeable countries (MID B/COW country list)
Merging by Numeric code Alphabetic code
Unmergeable countries in MID B 4 4
Mergeable countries in MID B & COW 191 191
Number of (un)mergeable countries in a merge of the MID B Dataset with the COW
country list
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1.5 Discussion & conclusion
Large-scale cross-country datasets are frequently merged in quantitative studies in conflict
and peace economics. We find that the coding of country units overlaps across datasets
only for a relatively small proportion of countries. Discrepancies in country naming or
other forms of country identification such as numerical or alphabetical country IDs are
frequent among countries splitting up or (re)uniting during the time period studied. Ex-
amples include Yugoslavia, Germany, Vietnam, and Sudan. If the names are not adjusted,
these inconsistencies render such observations unmergeable and, when joining variables
from several data sources, ultimately result in missing values. When these missing values
then are dropped from an analysis, important information is lost. This loss of information
is of particular severity in conflict and peace economics as countries which split up or
reunite often do so accompanied by armed conflict and thus contain valuable information.
The dataset comparisons made in this article demonstrate that inconsistencies in country
coding across macro panel datasets remain a relevant challenge in cross-national studies.
They show that for economic datasets as well as democracy datasets the unmergeable
group is of a large size (up to about 40 percent of all observations) and significantly differs
from the group of mergeable observations. In particular, the group of unmergeable coun-
tries is on average less democratic than the mergeable group. Depending on the economic
measure analyzed (and, with it, the country naming scheme applied), a group of countries
with high exports or another group of countries with low trade openness cannot be merged.
These discrepancies can be attributed, in part, to differences in country labels. Several
projects, such as Hensel (2001), and the aforementioned software codes and packages can
help adjust them. However, another part of the inconsistent country coding is due to dif-
ferent perceptions and definitions of the unit of analysis. The exercises carried out for this
article show that the actual entity captured can differ by source dataset. While this makes
creating merged panel datasets consisting of economic, political, or armed conflict factors
challenging in its own right, proper merging might be a necessary condition for analysis.
For an armed conflict dataset, relevant state units might differ significantly from datasets
on democracy or trade flows (the coding of Palestine, Hong Kong, or Macao are exam-
ples). As a result, the burden of discussing the unit of analysis studied and of ensuring that
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countries correspond to the same entity across merged datasets, lies with the individual
scholar or team. This article encourages scholars to discuss the merging process in their
academic papers (or supplementary materials) and to not take the problem of inconsistent
country names lightly. This is particularly the case in conflict and peace economics, where
relevant information is systematically lost when unmergeable observations are discarded.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that country names are not the only dimension of macro
panels to be carefully compared across datasets before merging. It goes well beyond the
scope of this article to additionally compare the actual time periods covered. However, we
point out that the time dimension underlying the calendar year coding of macro panels
does not necessarily coincide with the actual calendar year. To quote from the World
Bank: “In most economies the fiscal year is concurrent with the calendar year ... Most
economies report their national accounts and balance of payments data using calendar
years, but some use fiscal years” (World Development Indicators 2017b, p.117). Time in-
consistencies, then, are another potential source of erroneous inference, in particular when
studying the effect of conflict on the economy or the political system, or vice versa.
Last, but not least, we pay tribute to the creators of the datasets discussed in this article:
Assembling and maintaining these datasets is a Herculean task. The challenges associated
with inconsistent country names and units across datasets can, however, lead to serious
consequences in conflict and peace economics. Unfortunately, while an easy solution to
the noted problems is not likely to exist, given the different purposes each of the source
datasets is created for, we hope that our comments here increase broader awareness and
discussion of these problems and that our tables in the Appendix (and online) facilitate
quick cross-dataset comparisons of country coding.
Chapter 2
Is conflict really a trade barrier?
Assessing the impact of different
conflict types on trade with a
ppml panel approach
1
Abstract
The study of conflicts’ impact on trade has been mainly restricted to interstate disputes. Only very
few studies have looked at other conflict forms and their effect on trade. At the same time, the study
of impediments and enhancements to international trade has seen a lot of econometric advances to
quantify the impacts in a theory-consistent manner. This paper studies the effects of five different
conflict types on international trade flows in the period 1992 - 2011, including interstate and
internal conflicts as well as other types of violence. A gravity equation of internal trade and a
ppml high-dimensional fixed effects estimator are employed to account for country-specific as well
as country-pair heterogeneity and simultaneity. Main findings are that the heterogeneity of conflict
types generates negative as well as positive effects for trade.
JEL codes: F14, F51
1I would like to thank Christine Merk, Holger Go¨rg, Marie-Catherine Riekhof and Katerina Homolkova
for excellent comments and support throughout the project. I would furthermore like to thank Thierry
Mayer as well as participants of presentations of the project at Brown Bag Seminar 2015 in Economics,
Kiel, International Conference on Economics and Security 2015, Grenoble, European Trade Study Group
Conference 2015, Paris, Aarhus-Kiel Trade Workshop, Sandbjerg Gods, and Jan Tinbergen European
Peace Science Conference 2016, Milan, for valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are
my own.
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2.1 Introduction
In 2017, the World Bank estimated that within the six years from 2011 to 2016 the armed
conflict in Syria resulted in a cumulative loss in Syrian GDP of $226 billion - which equals
the fourfold of the Syrian GDP in 2010 (The World Bank 2017). Nordhaus projected in
2002, that the invasion of Iraq would cost the US overall nearly $2 trillion with another
$391 billion added via negative macroeconomic consequences (Nordhaus 2002). Both ex-
amples stress the negative economic impact of different types of conflict on the national
level. However, the repercussions of conflict are not restricted to national borders: Con-
flict impacts on the economy via a domestic and a globalisation channel. While several
studies have promoted interstate armed conflict to the status of a trade barrier (Glick
& Taylor 2010, Martin et al. 2008) and although civil wars have been shown to impact
negatively on economic growth (Blomberg & Hess 2002, Collier 1999), surprisingly very
few have included other forms than interstate armed conflict in their analysis (Blomberg
& Hess 2006, Long 2008, Couttenier & Vicard 2011, Marano et al. 2013, Qureshi 2013).
At the same time, the last century has witnessed a shift in distribution of conflict types.
Using data on armed conflict from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), figure 1
shows that in the 1950s, interstate armed conflict (conflict between two or more states)2
and extra-systemic armed conflict (colonial conflict) together where fought as often as
internal armed conflict (conflict within one state). The picture started to change in the
1960s: Since then, the number of internal armed conflicts has dramatically increased,
followed by a rise in internationalized internal armed conflict in the late 1970s. Simulta-
neously, extra-systemic armed conflict disappeared3 and interstate armed conflict numbers
have fallen drastically. To this day, most armed conflicts fought around the globe are hence
not wars between states, but rather wars within states. Furthermore, the end of World
War II denotes not only a decline in “classic” interstate armed conflict, but also a sharp
increase in revolutions, terrorism and insurgencies (Levy 2007). Again, using data from
the UCDP on non-state conflict (e.g. armed group clashes without government involve-
ment such as the drug war in Mexico) and one-sided violence (aggression towards civilians
as e.g. 9/11) Figure 2 illustrates this increase from 1989 on: Non-state conflict and one-
sided violence are approximately as frequent as all armed conflict types together (i.e. the
sum of all four armed conflict types shown in figure 1). The change in the frequency of
2For detailed definitions of all conflict types, see Section 2.1.2.
3The last extra-systemic conflict ended in 1974.
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different conflict types has been necessarily accompanied by a change in the overall in-
tensity of those. Figure 3 displays the total number of battle-related deaths for the five
conflict types provided by UCDP that will be used in the present study. It shows that
one-sided violence and internal armed conflict - purely monadic conflict types - are the
most destructive in terms of human losses.
Figure 2.1: Number of armed conflicts in the world by type, 1946-2016
Source: UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2014 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themne´r
& Wallensteen 2014), own visualization.
Considering the domestic and the globalisation channel of conflicts’ impact4, the question
remains whether internal conflict types impact on bilateral trade in the same way and to
the same extent as interstate or internationalized conflict types. Assessing this question via
cross-country analysis implies dealing with country-level as well as country-pair-level het-
erogeneity. Furthermore, multilateral trade resistance (Anderson & Van Wincoop 2003,
Baldwin & Taglioni 2007) and unobservable trade barriers (Baier & Bergstrand 2007)
need to be accounted for. Thus, an estimation with a full set of fixed effects, namely
country-time and country-pair fixed effects, is desirable. The additional need to address
heteroscedasticity and to tackle zero-trade flows by the use of poisson pseudo maximum
likelihood estimation (ppml) as proposed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006), led to the
recent development of the ppml high-dimensional fixed effects (hdfe) estimator by Zylkin
(2017), which renders the usually lengthy estimation of several fixed effects in a ppml set-
ting possible. The use of ppml is particularly desirable in the study of conflict and trade:
First, especially conflict-ridden countries tend to exhibit low or zero trade flows. Adding
4For a detailed description of the two channels see Section 2.1.1.
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an arbitrary number to the dependent variable to make the equation log-linearizable (as
e.g. in Eichengreen & Irwin 1995, 1997, Felbermayr & Kohler 2006) might distort the pic-
ture. The estimation in levels is thus desirable. Second, the relationship between conflict
and trade is reciprocal. The ppml hdfe estimator addresses this endogeneity by accounting
for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
The gravity equation of international trade (Tinbergen 1962) has become the workhorse
for estimating the impact of policy variables such as currency unions and regional or pref-
erential trade agreements on trade flows (see e.g. Baier & Bergstrand 2007, Glick & Rose
2002, Rose 2004). Literature examining the relationship between conflict and trade has as
well in great parts5 relied on the gravity equation: On the one hand, because conflict can
be regarded as a policy variable, on the other hand, because the distance between trading
partners influences both trade and conflict (Hegre et al. 2010, Chang et al. 2004).
Figure 2.2: Number of armed conflicts, non-state conflicts and one-sided violence, 1989-
2013
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program; own visualization.
This paper provides evidence that the heterogeneity of conflict types and their distinct
characteristics matter for their influence on trade. By employing the ppml hdfe estimator
in a gravity model framework and by using UCDP data on five different conflict types –
namely interstate armed conflict, internal armed conflict, internationalized internal armed
5E.g. Morrow et al. (1999), Vicard (2008) and Rohner et al. (2013) use a game-theoretical framework
for their analysis; Anderton & Carter (2001) and Barbieri & Levy (1999) employ interrupted time series
analysis, and Hegre et al. (2010) use a simultaneous equations model.
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conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence – this paper address the question: What
is the scope and the effect of internal and interstate or internationalized types of conflict
on international trade? Understanding the differences in the effects of conflicts on trade
and their magnitude is essential for a better understanding of (i) the extent to which the
different conflict types act as trade barriers and (ii) the losses and gains in trade as a
component of the economic repercussions of conflict.
Accordingly, this paper will contribute to two strands of literature: First, by using the
most fine-grained conflict categorization available from the UCDP this study accounts
for the changed nature of conflicts and thus ties in with recent attempts to quantify the
effects of other forms of conflict than interstate wars on international trade. Second, this
paper uses the gravity model of international trade and applies the state-of-the-art ppml
hdfe estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity on the country - as well as on the
country-pair - level. Thus, this study contributes to the ongoing literature on determi-
nants of international trade by adding new insights and re-evaluating earlier results from
the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.1.1 gives an overview of the literature and es-
tablishes testable hypotheses. Section 2.1.2 provides information on the data analyzed.
In Section 2.1.3 and 2.1.3 the methodology and empirical implementation are outlined,
followed by Section 2.1.4 where results for all conflict types and robustness checks are
presented. Section 2.1.5 discusses the results and Section 2.1.6 concludes.
2.1.1 Literature & Hypotheses
The impact of trade on international relations and the likelihood of war and peace has
been studied in-depth. Given the importance for trade policy and international relations,
this debate is still ongoing and shapes along the lines of the liberal and realist assumptions,
with empirical6 and theoretical7 results in favor of both arguments: While liberalists make
the case that trade promotes peace via generated economic benefits, realists argue that
trade might increase conflict potential via asymmetries. However, it is notable that the
relationship between trade and conflict is actually of simultaneous nature: While early
6Studies examining empirically the impact of trade on conflict are e.g. Anderton (2003), Li & Reuveny
(2011), Hegre et al. (2010), Russett & Oneal (2001), Polachek et al. (1999).
7For a detailed discussion of the two theories see e.g. Anderton et al. (2003), Barbieri & Reuveny
(2005), Hegre (2014, 2018), O’Neal & Russett (1999), Polachek & Seiglie (2007).
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Figure 2.3: Total battle-related deaths per conflict type, totals for 1992 – 2011
Source: UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset Version 18.1 (UCDP Battle-Related Deaths
dataset version 18.1 n.d.), Pettersson & Eck (2018b); own visualization.
research claimed a one-way causality running from trade to conflict (Polachek 1980, Arad
& Hirsch 1981) this assumption was later (Reuveney & Kang 1996, Hegre et al. 2010)
revised by showing that [...] there is good intuitive, theoretical, and empirical reason
to specify the relationship between international politics and commerce to be reciprocal;
changes in either one influence the other.“ (Pollins 1989, p. 758).8
Surprisingly, there is comparably little research focusing on the impact of conflict on trade.
The few studies mainly restricted their analysis to wars between states or even just wars
between major powers. Within this framework, early research focused on the effects of
international relations and military alliances on trade. Using data on diplomatic events
Polachek (1980) and later Pollins (1989) found that the most trade-intensive country-pairs
exhibit the lowest conflict involvements. Military alliances have been found to have a sta-
tistically significant positive and large effect on bilateral trade, with the effect being larger
when embedded in bipolar compared to multipolar systems (Gowa & Mansfield 1993).9
Furthermore, results by Mansfield & Bronson (1997) suggest that alliances that include a
major power trade more than alliances without a major-power counterparts.
Lateron, evidence for the liberal assumption was gathered: Barbieri & Levy (1999) found
no evidence that war between major powers reduces bilateral trade, although the anticipa-
tion of war was resembled in the trade data. Along the same lines, Mansfield & Pevehouse
8For a discussion of how to deal econometrically with the simultaneity bias inherent in the study of
trade and conflict, see Section 2.1.3.
9Dorussen (1999), Martin et al. (2008), Gartzke & Westerwinter (2016), Peterson (2011) discuss bi- and
multipolarity in the framework of trade and conflict.
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(2000) did not find a significant effect of militarized interstate disputes10 (MIDs) on bilat-
eral trade. However, these two studies contrast the results of a greater amount of papers,
finding a negative relationship between MIDs and trade: Anderton & Carter (2001) found
strong evidence that interstate war between major but also between non-major powers
is connected to a decrease in trade between the pre- and post-war period. Martin et al.
(2008) estimated that trade falls by 22% during a MID and that this negative impact
remains constant for another three years after the respective war. This persistent negative
effect seems to not only apply to countries in conflict, but also to neutral countries and
hence impacts on global economic welfare (Glick & Taylor 2010). Overall, studies either
focused on interstate disputes or major-power dyads and the majority found significant
negative effects of these conflict types on trade. Although data on MIDs is frequently used
in economic as well as political science analyses, it is worth noting that MIDs are defined
narrowly ranging from spoken threats to combat short of war. Furthermore, one in ten
MIDs (11%) between 1993 and 2010 was a dispute about fisheries (Hendrix & Roberts
2017). This limits the explanatory power of analyses using this data.
Despite the rise in internal and internationalized internal armed conflicts and the grow-
ing importance of non-state conflicts and one-sided violence, it is still unclear whether
the findings for MIDs and major-power dyad conflicts also apply to them. Only a small
group of papers has addressed this research gap. Bayer & Rupert (2004) used “civil war”
- which includes military and governmental involvement, effective resistance and at least
1,000 battle deaths - and found that civil wars yield a 30% decrease of bilateral trade.
It remains unclear whether their definition of conflict includes the involvement of foreign
governments and it is questionable why conflicts displaying less battle deaths should not
be included in the analysis. Furthermore, they applied ols estimation which was later
shown to be severely biased when estimating the log-linear version of the gravity model
(Santos Silva & Tenreyro 2006). Marano et al. (2013) focused on “interstate” and “in-
trastate conflict”, where the former refers to conflict between states including resistance
of foreign domination and the latter includes ethnic conflict and conflict between rival
political groups. Again, these conflict definitions do not allow for a differentiation be-
tween third-party involvement and pure monadic conflict or a mixture of both (as e.g. in
internationalized internal armed conflict). They concluded that internal conflicts have an
10“Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use
of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official
representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents
that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war.” (Jones et al. 1996, p.163)
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even larger negative impact on trade than interstate conflicts. Long (2008) and Blomberg
& Hess (2006) made use of a more detailed distinction: Long (2008) differentiated be-
tween “internal”, “internationalized internal” and “interstate armed conflict” and found
that even expectations of an internal conflict can lead to a reduction of trade. Blomberg
& Hess (2006) disaggregated even further and assessed the impact of violence including
terrorism, revolutions, interethnic fighting and external conflict on trade. They found that
the occurrence of violence has the same effect as a 30% tariff on trade, which suggests
that violence has a much larger negative effect than other trade impediments. However,
their results are probably biased as well because they as well applied ols estimation. Over-
all, studies focusing on the trade effect of different forms of conflict display two distinct
features. First, they illustrate the difficulty in separating conflict types accurately by ag-
gregating different conflict types into one category. Second, while mostly making use of
the gravity equation, all studies fall short of applying the theory-consistent ppml estimator.
Conflict affects trade through a domestic and a globalization channel. On the domestic
side, trade is affected by the loss of humans (either through deaths or flight), property
and infrastructure as these factors are crucial for trading goods (see e.g. Donaldson 2018).
During civil wars, private and social capital is redirected towards e.g. soldiering and pro-
curement of weapons (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Private investment and the capital stock
are reduced (Barro 1996, Imai & Weinstein 2000). Altogether, this impacts negatively on
production - as it shifts the production-possibility-frontier inwards - and on distribution of
traded goods, as trade routes are disrupted and transportation costs increase. In addition,
national income decreases - by reducing export profits and consumers’ buying power - and
thus the economic growth of a country (see e.g. Chauvin & Rohner 2009, Collier 1999,
2003, Stewart & Fitzgerald 2000). In conflict, countries face the so-called “guns vs. butter
trade-off”, where governments redirect large shares of GDP from public spending towards
defense expenditures (Collier 2003, Anderton & Carter 2009).
On the globalization side, present and future economic activities are disrupted by rising
political and economic insecurity. Economic agents limit or cease their business in view
of conflict: Firms react by supplying lesser exports and consumers demand fewer imports
due to risen opportunity costs (Long 2008). Results on firm’s stock performance during
ceasefires compared to times of conflict are mixed: While Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003)
showed that stocks perform better during truce, Guidolin & La Ferrara (2007) presented
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evidence for the diamond sector in the resource-dependent economy of Angola, where
firms profit by conflict. A reduction in the quality of institutions caused by corruption
and imperfect contract enforcement can act as a price mark-up and reduces trade as much
as tariffs do (Anderson & Marcouiller 2002).
Attributing each conflict types impact quantitatively to a specific mechanism is a herculean
task (Mueller 2013). There is no data available on conflict’s damages to e.g. infrastruc-
ture.11 Without detailed knowledge of the quantitative magnitude of the effect of conflict
for each mechanism, it remains difficult to hypothesize about affected production factors
and hence trade. However, all conflict types impact on trade through the domestic and
the globalization channel and can thus lead to trade disruption and/or trade diversion.
Hypotheses can be derived from the detailed conflict categorization and conflict types’ at-
tributes provided by UCDP. This allows for a differentiation between the impact of internal
conflicts and dyadic conflicts on bilateral trade, the impact of conflicts with government
involvement and without government involvement, the impact of location of conflict and
the impact of enmity between two states on trade. The domestic and the globalization
channel are impacted differently by these factors. Thus, bilateral trade can as well be
expected to be hit differently.
If a country in the trading dyad is location of a conflict, this country can be assumed to be
hit harder by this conflict, as it faces the greater part of destruction of humans, property
and infrastructure compared to a country sending troops to a conflict from afar. Marano
et al. (2013) give a detailed overview of the negative effects for exporters and importers
of being conflict location of interstate and internal conflicts. However, there is as well
evidence that especially in resource-dependent economies producers benefit from conflict
(Garfinkel et al. 2008, Guidolin & La Ferrara 2007). To test these conflicting results from
the literature, the first hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis (i): If a country in the trading dyad is location of a conflict,
trade is impacted negatively.
11One way to measure conflict intensity is the number of battle-related deaths. However, these are
reported per conflict and not per country. Due to e.g. NATO’s mutual defense clause countries like
e.g. Germany or Spain would display high numbers of battle-related deaths which would, however, not
adequately reflect their actual conflict involvement and would be disproportionate compared to conflict-
ridden countries. Hence, this measure might produce spurious results and is therefore inadequate.
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However, there is an important difference between conflict that happens between states
and conflict that happens within states. Although the fraction of conflicts that happen
within states (see section 2.1.2) as well as their destruction in terms of battle-deaths (see
figure 2.3) is higher compared to conflicts that happen between states, the latter might
as well impact negatively on trade because it implies two rivaling states and hence might
lead to the deterioration of bilateral trade relations, as the literature on trade and MIDs
has shown. Long (2008) uses the same conflict categorization as the present study and
finds a higher negative effect of interstate armed conflict than for internal conflict. More
importantly, he as well estimates the impact of rivalry in the dyad and finds a large neg-
ative impact on dyadic trade.
Hypothesis (ii): If the countries in the trading dyad are enemies in the same
conflict, trade is impacted more negatively than if both in the
dyad are involved in the same conflict but not enemies.
Conflict types vary in terms of actors involved: In some governments are involved, some
only involve non-state actors. These usually have no access to use public spending for
conflict means. Additionally, especially the conflict types involving governments as actors
display higher numbers of battle-related deaths than non-state conflict12 (see Figure 2.3).
Hypothesis (iii): Conflict types with government involvement impact more
negatively on trade than conflict types without government
involvement.
Last but not least, the ppml hdfe estimator itself serves as a basis to hypothesize: Since
the application by the authors to currency unions has only been published very recently13,
there is not a wide range of research using this approach. Results by Larch et al. (2018)
suggest that previous literature overestimated the positive effect of currency unions. The
high number of fixed effects removes all possible country-level and bilateral heterogeneity
as well as bilateral time-invariant simultaneity. Furthermore, Santos Silva & Tenreyro
(2006) suggest that former studies using ols estimators overestimated the effect of geogra-
12Non-state conflict is the only conflict type without government involvement. Note that one-sided
violence consists of cases where governments are involved and those where aggression is exerted only by
non-state actors. The latter makes the majority of cases but the fewer battle-deaths (140246 compared
to 565805 in the cases where governments are involved). This fact as well supports the argument made
above.
13The paper by Larch et al. (2018) was published in November 2018.
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phy on trade.
Hypothesis (iv): Results from ppml hdfe are smaller in magnitude than those
from other estimators seen previously in the literature.
2.1.2 Data
In the majority of papers discussing conflict and trade the time series ends in the year 2000
or even earlier. Hence, current conflicts - as e.g. the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in
2003, which still shape the global political and economic present – are not included. This
study incorporates the time series 1992 to 2011 to overcome this problem. In addition,
observations are not limited to major-power dyads14 as seen in great parts of the literature:
The trade data contains information on 236 countries and includes all available export and
import pairs. Bilateral trade data (in 1000 US$) taken from the United Nations Comtrade
Database (2008) and is defined at cost insurance and freight values. Information on the
GDP of exporter and importer (in current US$) is taken from the World Development In-
dicators (2013) (WDI). Distance accounts for geographic characteristics and represents the
usual gravity controls together with preferential trade agreements. As a measure of dis-
tance the population weighted great circle distance between the countries most populated
cities is used. They are taken from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (2015). Both, distance as well as preferential trade agreements, are time-
variant country-pair variables and thus not removed by the high-dimensional fixed effects.
Other commonly used control variables in gravity equations (such as e.g. national income
measured as GDP and contiguity) and in the study of trade and conflict (as e.g. the level
of democracy) are either time-variant country-level or time-invariant country-pair level
variables. The applied high-dimensional fixed effects control for these characteristics.
Former studies used data on MIDs from the Correlates of War Project (e.g. Glick & Taylor
2010, Martin et al. 2008), data from the Center for Systemic Peace (e.g. Marano et al.
2013, Qureshi 2013) or self-assembled measures of conflict (e.g. Blomberg & Hess 2006,
Mansfield & Pevehouse 2000). Datasets vary in definitions of conflict types, intensity
14The limitation of the analysis to major-power dyads is problematic because it creates a non-random
sample and hence limits valid inference. For a discussion see e.g. Benson (2005), Lemke & Reed (2001).
This procedure is seen especially in early studies on conflict and trade and is mostly due to the limited
availability of trade and conflict data. Fortunately, data availability has improved significantly during the
past two decades.
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measurement and temporal and spatial dimensions. To the author’s knowledge, the 2014
UCDP data has not yet been used for studying the impact of conflicts on trade.15 This is
even more surprising because the conflict typology of the UCDP has several advantages
compared to other data16: Conflict categories include all possible internal and external
conflicts (except the sole threat or display of the use of force17), ranging from armed group
clashes without government participation, over repression exerted by governments towards
civilians, to civil war with participation of external governments. Hence, there is a very
clear and detailed distinction between interstate conflicts and internal conflicts, which is
crucial for this study: In contrast to former research that either looked at MIDs or civil
war, this fine-grained conflict categorization allows to compare their impact on trade flows.
Furthermore, UCDP data has global coverage, are updated annually and provide a lot of
additional information on the different conflict types.18
To obtain a dataset that covers the described broad range of conflicts, three datasets
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (2014) /Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO) where combined: The Armed Conflict19 dataset, the Non-state conflict dataset
and the One-sided violence dataset.
15It is worth noting that Long (2008) uses the 2002 version of the UCDP data, with a time-series running
until 2001.
16For a detailed discussion of conflict data see, e.g. Boese & Kamin (2019), Keshk et al. (2010)
17Hence, the deterioration of international relations triggered by spoken threats or the display of troops,
as for example currently seen in different communications of the Trump administration towards North
Korea, Russia, or China, would not be included in the data, since UCDP only codes a conflict as such once
25 battle-related deaths are recorded.
18E.g. information on incompatibility, start and end date of conflict, battle-related deaths, inactive years
of conflict, organizational level of warring parties, etc.
19Armed conflict by definition generally also includes extra-systemic conflict, but this category basically
contains colonial conflicts. The last extra-systemic conflict ended in 1974. Hence, no extra-systemic conflict
is covered by the timeseries of the present dataset.
CHAPTER 2. IS CONFLICT REALLY A TRADE BARRIER? 37
T
ab
le
2.
1:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
al
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
u
se
d
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
(D
)
V
ar
ia
b
le
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
M
in
M
a
x
ye
ar
41
8,
02
7
20
02
.4
98
5.
47
09
38
1
9
9
2
2
0
1
1
E
x
p
or
ts
41
7,
21
1
1.
91
e+
09
9.
18
e+
10
0
1
.5
0
e+
1
3
p
op
u
la
ti
on
-w
ei
gh
te
d
d
is
ta
n
ce
40
1,
13
6
73
82
.6
22
45
20
.5
37
3
5
.5
9
1
3
1
1
9
7
3
4
.8
9
p
re
fe
re
n
ti
al
tr
ad
e
ag
re
em
en
t
41
8,
02
3
.0
77
56
03
.2
67
47
88
0
1
i
or
j
in
in
te
rs
ta
te
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
02
17
09
1
0.
14
57
32
3
0
1
i
or
j
lo
ca
ti
on
of
an
in
te
rs
ta
te
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
01
90
96
9
0.
13
68
65
7
0
1
i
or
j
in
in
te
rn
a
l
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
20
28
43
4
0.
40
21
17
3
0
1
i
or
j
in
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ze
d
in
te
rn
a
l
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
27
99
43
6
0.
44
89
71
8
0
1
i
or
j
lo
ca
ti
on
of
an
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ze
d
in
te
rn
a
l
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
02
21
92
3
0.
14
73
08
9
0
1
i
or
j
in
n
o
n
-s
ta
te
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
14
02
32
6
0.
34
72
28
6
0
1
i
or
j
in
o
n
e-
si
d
ed
vi
o
le
n
ce
41
8,
02
7
0.
18
51
48
3
0.
38
84
18
3
0
1
i
or
j
h
av
e
a
n
ei
gh
b
or
at
w
ar
41
8,
02
7
0.
47
54
16
7
0.
49
93
95
9
0
1
B
ot
h
in
in
te
rs
ta
te
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
00
01
36
4
0.
01
16
76
3
0
1
E
n
em
ie
s
in
in
te
rs
ta
te
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
00
00
64
6
0.
00
80
36
5
0
1
B
ot
h
in
in
te
rn
a
l
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
01
14
49
0.
10
63
85
9
0
1
B
ot
h
in
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ze
d
in
te
rn
a
l
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
04
50
49
7
0.
20
74
13
5
0
1
E
n
em
ie
s
in
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ze
d
in
te
rn
a
l
a
rm
ed
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
00
00
88
5
0.
00
94
07
6
0
1
B
ot
h
in
n
o
n
-s
ta
te
co
n
fl
ic
t
41
8,
02
7
0.
00
49
51
8
0.
07
01
94
9
0
1
B
ot
h
in
o
n
e-
si
d
ed
vi
o
le
n
ce
41
8,
02
7
0.
00
98
96
5
0.
09
89
87
7
0
1
CHAPTER 2. IS CONFLICT REALLY A TRADE BARRIER? 38
From these three datasets five conflict types across a total of 128 countries are considered
in this paper:
• Interstate armed conflict (# of events: 7)
• Internal armed conflict (# of events: 107)
• Internationalized internal armed conflict (# of events: 25)
• Non-state conflict (# of events: 414)
• One-sided violence (# of events: 206)
UCDP codes a conflict as such once a minimum threshold of at least 25 battle-related
deaths per year is reached.20 Armed conflict always includes at least one government as
a warring party in the conflict and is defined as “[. . . ] a contested incompatibility that
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”
(Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themne´r & Wallensteen 2014, UCDP/PRIO 2014, p. 1). The three
armed conflict types included are defined as follows: interstate armed conflict “[. . . ]occurs
between two or more states”, such as e.g. the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan
in Kashmir, internal armed conflict “[. . . ]occurs between the government of a state and
one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states”, such as
e.g. the conflict between Turkey and PKK or Israel and the Hamas, and internationalized
internal armed conflict “[. . . ] occurs between the government of a state and one or more
internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on
one or both sides”, among those the more prominent ones such as e.g. the conflicts in Iraq
or Afghanistan, but as well the ongoing conflict in Congo (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themne´r
& Wallensteen 2014, UCDP/PRIO 2014, p. 9).
Non-state conflict does per definition not include states as warring parties, while one-
sided violence describes the aggression against civilians by the government or an organized
group. Non-state conflict is defined as “[. . . ] the use of armed force between two orga-
nized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least
25 battle-related deaths in a year.” (Sundberg et al. 2012a,b). Examples for non-state
conflict are the fights between the groups Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan and the Taleban
or the ongoing drug war in Mexico between different cartels.
20Note that the numbers on battle-related deaths are not attributable to each actor, but rather are total
battle-related deaths per year within the respective conflict.
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One-sided violence is defined as “[. . . ] the use of armed force by the government of a state
or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths”
(Eck & Hultman 2007, Kreutz 2008). Examples for one-sided violence are e.g. cases of
repression and genocide, such as in Guatemala or Darfur. Information on government
involvement is used to test hypothesis (iii).
Furthermore, UCDP reports different sides to a conflict namely side A, side B, side A sec-
ond and side B second. Side A always represents the party which has the primary claim
to the conflict, side B represents the opponent and the secondary sides the respective
supporters. Secondary sides are only reported for the armed conflict case. Within this
category, side A represents a government, side B may be a government (for example in
the cases of interstate armed conflict and internationalized internal armed conflict), but
can also be a non-state actor (e.g. paramilitary group, rebel group, etc.). In the category
one-sided violence, side A may be a government, but can also be a non-state group, while
in non-state conflict both actors are per definition non-state actors.
This is important for three reasons: First, a decision has to be made which sides to include
as conflict observations. This comes down to the question whether one assumes that all
sides to a conflict respond to the same level of involvement. One could argue that the
side with primary claim to the conflict (namely side a) has the highest involvement level
in the conflict. To obtain as many conflict observations as possible and by assuming that
conflict has an impact on trade no matter on which side of the conflict an actor stands, all
conflict involvements on all sides were included. Second, conflicts have to be attributable
to a country to allow merging with the trade data. Accordingly, all conflict datasets where
combined via the variable “Location”. For the armed conflict category “Location” is un-
equal to the geographical location of conflict, but describes the country of the government
with the primary claim to the conflict. For the categories non-state conflict and one-sided
violence, the variable “Location” indicates the geographical location of the conflict. Third,
information on enmity between two countries is used to test hypothesis (ii).
Obviously, a bias arises from combining conflict observations that yield the hidden infor-
mation of being a war zone, and the ones that are not: A country experiencing conflict
on its territory can be expected to be more severely impacted on by that conflict than a
country that is sending troops. To differentiate these cases and to test hypothesis (i) a
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location dummy was created, which indicates whether the respective country is location
of conflict or not.21 This study does not distinguish between a country being location of
one or of more than one conflict. Hence, the location dummy is equal to 1 if a country
is location of at least one conflict of that type. A detailed overview of all conflict type
involvement per country can be found in the appendix.
Two important features about the conflict data that have to be considered when interpret-
ing the results have to be pointed out: First, while the interstate armed conflict country
group largely consists of countries that also were the location of the conflict (80%), the
reverse is true for internationalized internal armed conflict, where only 24.4% were the
location of conflict. Second, the extent to which different conflict types appear simultane-
ously is striking: All 15 countries involved in interstate armed conflict have been involved
in at least one other type of conflict before or during the same time. For internal armed
conflict the picture is very similar with only one country out of 60 being solely involved
in that conflict type and not in another. internationalized internal armed conflict paints
a different picture: 65.6% are solely involved in this conflict type during the time series,
but only one country in this group is conflict location. As shown above, this group mainly
consists of countries that are involved in conflict from afar and those countries that are
location of an internationalized internal armed conflict as well host other conflict types.
Non-state conflict (96.6%) and one-sided violence (93.4%) again are proof for the argu-
ment made above that conflict types strikingly often appear simultaneously.
A small number of studies has looked at the impact of conflict in a neighboring country
on trade for the home country: Marano et al. (2013), Qureshi (2013) and Couttenier &
Vicard (2011) find negative effects of conflict in the neighboring country on bilateral trade
of countries not involved. De Groot (2010) studies the regional spillover effects of conflict
onto economic growth and finds a negative effect for directly contiguous countries, but
a positive effect for non-contiguous countries. Furthermore, conflict in the neighboring
country does not only affect the economy of the home country, but as well increases the
likelihood of a conflict in the home country, as Carmignani & Kler (2016) show. To control
21This dummy was created by means of the “Location” variable provided in the UCDP data. As described
above, the information comprised by the location variable differs between the datasets. However, UCDP
points out that in the armed conflict category “[. . . ] in practice, “location” often equals the geographical
location of the violence.” (UCDP definitions, ”Location” n.d.). All armed conflicts where checked to make
sure only countries that where location of conflict would be included in the dummy. Adjustments had to
be made in the case of the invasion of Iraq, where the “locations” United States, United Kingdom and
Australia where dropped, since the battle only took place in Iraq.
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for these spillover effects, a dummy variable is added which is equal to one if a neighboring
country of the exporter or the importer is in conflict. This dummy was created using the
information from the “location” variables in the UCDP data and the Direct Contiguity
(v3.2) Dataset from the Correlates of War Project22. From this dataset, the category
“Land contiguity” is used, which is defined as “[. . . ] the intersection of the homeland
territory of the two states in the dyad, either through a land boundary or a river (such as
the Rio Grande in the case of the US-Mexico border) [. . . ]”23(Correlates of War Project.
Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.2. 2016).
2.1.3 Model, Methodology & Estimation
Model & Methodology
The present paper employs the gravity model of international trade to examine the impact
of conflict on trade. However, the single equation nature of the gravity model does not ac-
count for the simultaneity bias inherent in the study of conflict and trade and might thus
lead to inconsistent and biased results (Polachek 1980, Polachek & Seiglie 2007). One
option to solve this endogeneity problem would be an instrumental variable approach,
but most eligible variables - such as preferential trade agreements or military expendi-
tures - are correlated with both trade and conflict (see Hegre et al. 2010, Martin et al.
2008, Polachek & Seiglie 2007) and do hence not serve as proper instruments. The most
promising alternative to deal with simultaneity is to exploit the variation over time by
including country-pair fixed effects which control for omitted time-invariant country-pair
characteristics (Glick & Taylor 2010, Head & Mayer 2014). Estimating the gravity equa-
tion with country-pair fixed effects has two pitfalls: First, an analysis of bilateral control
variables is not possible. Second, a theory consistent estimation with the ppml model
proposed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006)24 controlling for multilateral trade resistance
is only possible if a multilateral resistance measure is constructed and implemented (as
proposed e.g. by Baldwin & Taglioni 2006, Head & Mayer 2000, Head 2003). Recently,
Larch et al. (2018) proposed a further development of the ppml panel estimator which
introduces a full set of fixed effects - namely exporter-time, importer-time, and pair fixed
effects – to the estimation. This allows the estimation of a gravity equation controlling
22Correlates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.2.; Stinnett et al. (2002).
23Note that, due to lack of a clear definition of “contiguity” on the part of CEPII, a clearly defined
contiguity measure for the construction of the neighbor-at-war variable was chosen, following the approach
of Qureshi (2013).
24In Stata, the conventional ppml command does not allow for the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects.
CHAPTER 2. IS CONFLICT REALLY A TRADE BARRIER? 42
for multilateral trade resistance and simultaneity and hence serves in this paper as the
estimator of choice. Breusch-Pagan-tests were performed to test for the presence of het-
eroscedasticity. A p-value less than 0.001 was obtained in all cases, strongly rejecting the
null-hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Estimating the constant elasticity model in log-linear
form is thus inadequate and the ppml-specification remains the estimator of choice. Addi-
tionally, the squared correlation coefficients between observed and predicted values of the
dependent variable were calculated as a measure of goodness-of-fit (reported in Tables 21
- 25). Despite the overall good fit of the gravity model in all specifications, the R2 for the
ppml-specifications displays higher values than for the linear form.
Nevertheless, the ppml estimation strategy as well holds a few pitfalls that have to be
considered: “In the presence of importer and exporter fixed effects a variety of poten-
tially interesting trade determinants can no longer be identified in a gravity equation.
Notably, (1) anything that affects exporters’ propensity to export to all destinations [. . . ],
(2) variables that affect imports without regard to origin, [. . . ] and (3) sums, averages
and differences of country-specific variables. If any variable of these three forms is added
to a trade equation estimated with importer and exporter fixed effects, programs such as
Stata will report estimates with standard errors. However the estimates are meaningless”
(Head & Mayer 2014, p. 158). Hence, to include country-based time-variant dummies
in the estimation, these have to be bilateralized, otherwise Stata will either drop them
because of collinearity or report biased estimates. Accordingly, the dummy variables con-
flict, location and neighbor were bilateralized to keep them in the estimation. Thus, the
conflict dummy yields the information whether the exporter or the importer have been in
conflict. This implies that no conclusion can be drawn for the exporter or the importer
specifically, but rather more generally for one of both being in conflict. For the case where
both countries in the dyad are involved in conflict another dummy is introduced which
indicates when both countries are involved in the same conflict in a given year.
To make differences visible and comparable with past results from the literature and to
check for robustness the gravity model is estimated in four specifications, namely
(A) ols with country-time fixed effects (ctfe)
(B) ols with exporter-time and importer-time and country-pair fixed effects (hdfe)
(C) ppml with exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects (ctfe)
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(D) ppml with exporter-time and importer-time and country-pair fixed effects (hdfe)
Specification (D) is the estimator of choice. Results are presented in Table 2.2. All other
results are provided in the Appendix (Tables 21 - 25). Specifications (A) and (B) are esti-
mated with the Stata command ‘reghdfe’ written by Sergio Correia (2016). Specification
(C) is estimated with Stata command ‘ppml panel sg’ written by Tom Zylkin (2017). To
estimate only country-time fixed effects, pair fixed effects were supressed with the ”nopair”
option of the ‘ppml panel sg’-command.
Estimation
The present study applies a gravity model with a ppml hdfe estimator to examine the
impact of different conflict types on global trade flows. An estimable specification of the
conventional gravity model of international trade, which can be formally derived from
a general equilibrium model of trade, production and consumption as in Anderson &
Van Wincoop (2003), is used. The ppml estimator requires an estimation with the de-
pendent variable in levels and continuous regressors in logs (equation (1)). Accordingly,
regression equation (1) is given by
Xij,t = exp
[
β1conflictij,t + β2locationij,t + β3neighborij,t + β4bothij,t+
β5enemyij,t + β9log(distij,t) + β10ptaij,t + ωi,t + ρj,t + µij
]
+ ij,t
(2.1)
where i and j denote exporter and importer country, t denotes time, and the other variables
are defined as:
Xij,t is the total trade value exported from origin i to destination j at time t;
conflictij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been involved in the respective conflict
at time t;
locationij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been location of the respective conflict at
time t;
neighborij,t is a dummy being unity if the neighbor of i or j has been involved in a conflict
at time t;
bothij,t is a dummy being unity if both, i and j, have been involved in the respective con-
flict at time t;
enemyij,t is a dummy being unity if i and j have been enemies in the respective conflict
at time t;
distij,t is measuring the population-weighted distance between i and j at time t;
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ptaij,t is a dummy variable being unity if a preferential trade agreement exists at time t;
ωi,t and ρj,t represent the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects;
µij are the country-pair fixed effects, and
ij,t is the error term, taking up all other influences on dyadic trade.
Regression equation (1) is estimated for each of the five conflict types. locationij,t is only
added to the estimation where the conflict type itself does not include this information:
As described in Section 2.1.2, internal armed conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided
violence per se take place within the country involved in the conflict. For the conflict
categories interstate armed conflict and internationalized internal armed conflict, where
more countries can be involved than only the country where the fighting takes place, the
dummy was added. neighborij,t controls for a minimal (or relaxed) definition of conflict
involvement: It only indicates whether the neighbor is involved in a conflict. neighborij,t
does not indicate in which conflict type the neighbor is involved in, the number of conflicts
the neighbor is involved in or whether or not the neighboring country is the location of a
conflict.
2.1.4 Results
Overview tables for each conflict type with results from all specifications (A), (B), (C) and
(D) can be found in the Appendix (Tables 21 - 25). The R2s in these tables support the
choice of the preferred specification (D) which displays the best model fit. Table 2.2 shows
regression results for specification (D). Each column displays the results for one conflict
type. Main results from the regressions are as follows.
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Impact of exporter or importer being in conflict
First, only interstate armed conflict impacts negatively and significantly on international
trade, reducing trade flows by e−0.0397 - 1 = - 3.9%. This negative effect is robust across all
other specifications except ols hdfe where it is negative but not significant (see Table 21).
Second, all other conflict types impact positively and significantly on international trade
except for non-state conflict, where the result is positive but not significant. The presence
of an internal armed conflict displays the highest positive impact on trade (11.8%), fol-
lowed by internationalized internal armed conflict (10.5%) and one-sided violence (4.8%).
Note that this finding is not robust for the other specifications: Ols estimations display
negative effects for all conflict types on trade (except for internationalized internal armed
conflict and one-sided violence in the ols hdfe-specification where the results are not sig-
nificant). Surprisingly, the “classic” ppml-specification with country-time fixed effects
shows a trade reduction of ≈ 99% for each conflict type. Third, being the location of an
interstate armed conflict additionally decreases trade by 24.2%, and being the location of
an internationalized internal armed conflict has as well a negative and significant effect
(-8.9%). Only the latter result is robust across all specifications (see Table 23), while the
result for interstate armed conflict is only robust in the ppml specifications (see Table 21).
Note that the other conflict types imply by definition also the conflict location). Fourth, if
the importer or exporter have a neighbor in conflict their trade is not affected: Estimates
are positive, but very small and not significant. This result is robust across conflict types
but only for the hdfe-specifications.
Impact of both being involved in a conflict
Generally, the “both in conflict”-specification should resemble the results from the “i or
j”-specification, although magnitude and significance might differ since the cases where
both countries in the trading dyad are involved in the same conflict type are expected to be
fewer compared to those where only exporter or importer are involved. Overall, the results
show these expected similarities: First, if both countries are involved in an interstate armed
conflict trade is affected negatively but not significantly, with the negative result being
robust across all specifications. Second, internal armed conflict and internationalized
internal armed conflict display a positive impact on international trade by 27.3% and
11.9% respectively. The result for internationalized internal armed conflict is robust for
the hdfe-specifications, while internal armed conflict displays positive and high results
in all other specifications. One-sided violence and non-state conflict display positive but
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not significant estimates, which are robust only for the hdfe specifications in the former,
and only for ppml hdfe in the latter case. If both countries were involved in the same
internationalized internal armed conflict and were enemies, trade is decreased by 37.7%.
This high negative effect is robust across all specifications. For interstate armed conflict,
the result is negative but not significant. In this case, ctfe specifications yield high negative
and significant effects, while ols hdfe yields a positive but not significant result.
Control variables
In the ppml hdfe specification, only two control variables are included: Distance and pref-
erential trade agreements. While distance does not have a significant effect in this speci-
fication, preferential trade agreements have a positive and highly significant effect across
all conflict types and across all specifications except for ppml ctfe, where the estimate
is negative and high. For distance the result is unique compared to other specifications:
For ols and ppml with ctfe the effects are negative, significant and high. For ols hdfe the
estimate is positive and significant.
2.1.5 Discussion
This paper estimates the effects of different types of conflict on trade by using a ppml
hdfe approach. Major findings are that solely interstate armed conflict impacts negatively
on exports, while internal armed conflict, internationalized internal armed conflict and
one-sided violence have a positive effect on trade flows. Being location of an interstate
armed conflict or an internationalized internal armed conflict impacts negatively and sig-
nificantly on trade. Furthermore, enmity between trading states has a large negative effect
when the countries are rivals in an internationalized internal armed conflict.
The negative impact of interstate armed conflict appears to be robust to the removal of
all dyadic heterogeneity by hdfe. Overall, the obtained result is in line with previous
findings from the literature, although the impact is much less severe than e.g. the trade
decreasing effect of interstate dispute found by Martin et al. (2008) of 22%, but closer to
the result of Blomberg & Hess (2006) who found a negative but not significant effect of
external wars on trade. Considering the overall low number of interstate armed conflict
(see Table 29) in comparison to the other conflict types, the still significant and negative
effect on trade matches the assumption made above that interstate armed conflict is es-
pecially destructive in terms of production factors and trade relations. This argument is
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furthermore supported by the additional high negative impact implied when being loca-
tion of an interstate armed conflict. As aforementioned, this conflict type appears always
simultaneously with other conflict types. Thus, the question remains how much of the
effect of other conflict types on trade might be picked up by the effect of interstate armed
conflict. This simultaneity in appearance of conflict types is, however, as well true for
internal armed conflict and one-sided violence, which show positive effects on trade flows.
These results, as well as the positive effect of internationalized internal armed conflict on
trade, are contrary to previous findings which provided evidence for negative effects of
internal wars and other forms of violence (Blomberg & Hess 2006, Marano et al. 2013).
Internationalized internal armed conflict is a special case: First, it displays an internal
armed conflict where external governments are involved, often so via cases such as NATO’s
mutual defense clause. Second, the majority of countries involved in this group are not
location of the conflict – in contrast to internal armed conflict and one-sided violence
- which is mirrored by the results: Once a country is location of an internationalized
internal armed conflict, the impact is negative and significant. Additionally, the coun-
tries that are not location of an internationalized internal armed conflict but involved in
such a conflict are usually western states such as the US or European countries. The
positive effect of an internationalized internal armed conflict on trade might be driven
precisely by these countries which profit from their involvement in conflict by increased
trade in e.g. munitions but also other supplies to troops. Furthermore, the positive result
for both trading partners being involved in an internationalized internal armed conflict
might provide evidence supporting earlier findings that alliances trade more (Gowa &
Mansfield 1993). The positive effects of internal armed conflict and one-sided violence
on trade are much more staggering and allow for several possible interpretations. First,
both conflict types include government involvement. Thus, increased trade levels could
be due to increased demand for conflict goods supplied by the government as in the case
of internationalized internal armed conflict. However, as these conflict types are purely
internal, a closer look has to be taken onto the characteristics of the countries affected. As
Cal`ı (2014) demonstrates, countries in internal conflict often display a high dependence
on primary export commodities and a low diversification in terms of production. The
dependent variable in this analysis is the value of total exports. When a country is hit
by conflict a reduction in production quantities may lead to increased prices. This is not
only true for the country in conflict, but as well for trading partners who have to import
higher priced commodities from other countries. Thus, the traded value might increase,
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although the traded quantity decreases or stagnates. In turn, what is mirrored in the
estimates might not be the suspected negative influence of conflict on production factors,
but rather the shortage following these impacts and the associated market reactions (see
e.g. Garfinkel et al. 2008, for a discussion of oil-dependent countries and internal conflict).
For the conflict types interstate armed conflict and internationalized internal armed con-
flict the additional effect of being the location of the conflict is estimated and a negative
and significant effect on trade is found for both. Since the other conflict types - that are
per definition conflict locations - displayed overall increases in trade, no statement can
be made on the impact of being location for these types of conflict. The fact that being
the location of an interstate armed conflict impacts on trade much more severely than
solely being involved in such a conflict is a revealing result: Except Marano et al. (2013)
previous studies that examined the effect of those types of conflicts did not control for the
location of conflict. Thus, some of the high negative effects found might be picking up this
location effect. Moreover, this study cannot confirm earlier findings on negative spillover-
effects (Couttenier & Vicard 2011, Marano et al. 2013, Qureshi 2013) of a neighbor in
conflict. Overall, the results for interstate armed conflict and internationalized internal
armed conflict proof that hypothesis (i) cannot be rejected. However, the results from
other conflict types and from the neighbor in conflict variable suggest that the effect of
being the location of a conflict depends on the conflict type.
Being enemies overall presents the most tremendous decrease in trade of 37.7% for in-
ternationalized internal armed conflict. This is very revealing especially in the context
of internationalized internal armed conflict, where a lot of external states are involved in
an internal conflict. Being location of an internationalized internal armed conflict is also
negative for trade, but the effect is smaller than the enmity effect. Furthermore, if two
states are involved in the conflict but are not enemies, this actually yields an increase
in trade. For interstate armed conflict, the effect of being conflict location seems to be
more important than being enemies. The results are in line with the findings on rivalry
from e.g. Long (2008), however, especially the results for internationalized internal armed
conflict are novelty since, to the authors knowledge, no study on trade and conflict before
included this conflict type. Hypothesis (ii) can thus be accepted.
Results for testing hypothesis (iii) are mixed. For non-state conflict - the only conflict
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type where no governments are involved - overall no significant results are found (except
for the control variable preferential trade agreements). This finding seems to confirm hy-
pothesis (iii), namely that government involvement matters for the magnitude of the effect
of conflict on trade. It has to be noted that for non-state conflict the lowest numbers of
battle-related deaths are reported. This points towards another possible interpretation:
Differences in the destruction of human capital could drive variation in the impacts of the
different conflict types. However, this interpretation can be partly dismissed because the
conflict types with the highest numbers of battle-related deaths - internal armed conflict
and one-sided violence - also have a positive impact on trade. Nevertheless, a combi-
nation of both – low numbers of battle-deaths and no governmental involvement – lead
to no effects for exports in the non-state conflict case. All other conflict types involve
governments and display significant positive as well as significant negative results. Thus,
it can be stated that government involvement in conflict matters for trade, but it does not
necessarily have an negative effect: Hypothesis (iii) has to be rejected.
Hypothesis (iv) can be confirmed: Overall, estimated coefficients of the ppml hdfe speci-
fication are smaller in magnitude than results from other estimators. Moreover, the ppml
panel estimator yields significant results when applying hdfe. For some conflict types,
this is as well the case for the ols hdfe specification. However, the signs in these cases
are reversed. Interestingly, the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects changes the results
between the two ols specifications: There is no obvious pattern visible in these changes,
as a lot of switches in sign and significance occur. However, overall the magnitude of
the effects is reduced by the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects. A similar difference
is visible between the ppml specifications. The “classic” ppml-specification with only
country-time fixed effects shows a trade reduction of ≈ 99% for each conflict type. The
difference between these results and the ppml hdfe-specification is striking. Country-pair
heterogeneity thus seems to yield important information driving the ppml and ols ctfe
specification results. The R2s support the notion that country-pair heterogeneity should
be accounted for, as the hdfe specifications display the better fit compared to the ctfe
specifications. Moreover, the goodness-of-fit as well as the Breusch-Pagan-Test results
support controlling for heteroscedasticity by the use of the ppml estimator. The results
for the control variable distance supports the finding by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006),
namely that the role of geographic characteristics is overestimated by ols. In contrary,
the effect of preferential trade agreements is robust to the removal of all country-pair and
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country-time heterogeneity. Hence, even in times of conflict, preferential trade agreements
have a positive effect on trade.
2.1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that not all conflict types act as trade barriers. The study of
trade and conflict should account for the heterogeneity of conflict types and their distinct
characteristics. Attributes like the location of conflict and actors involved matter for the
direction of impact on trade. Especially the increasing number of internationalized inter-
nal armed conflicts and the striking result of a 37.7% trade reduction between enemies
in such a conflict as well as the trade-increasing effects of internal conflict types need to
be considered in further studies. The biggest strenght of the ppml hdfe estimator is the
biggest caveat at the same: The high-dimensional fixed effects control for a lot of variation
that might be helpful in understanding differences in the results. The variation in results
complicates the determination of policy implications. Increasing trade volumes in times of
conflict might not reflect the damages emanating from conflict and might cover-up actual
welfare-effects. Understanding the mechanisms behind why some conflicts act as trade
barriers and some seem to have a trade-increasing effect is a desirable direction of future
research. Studies will have to focus on single countries to understand how conflict impacts
on economic welfare and how or if this translates into changes in trade volumes. Hence,
disaggregated country studies looking more closely at sector-level changes will be valuable
to complement time-series cross section analyses. Country case studies focusing on the
effect of different conflict types on production factors could as well contribute to under-
standing variation in impact and magnitude of often simultaneously appearing conflict
types.
Chapter 3
Heterogeneity matters:
On the dynamic interactions
between trade, development,
democracy and conflict
together with Vanessa A. Boese1
Abstract
The past decade has witnessed a return to protectionist measures as well as a global rise in na-
tionalist movements. Understanding the economic and political effects of such changes in trade
policies or levels of democracy has gained renewed importance. There is a vast amount of literature
studying the bilateral relationships between international trade flows, democracy, development and
conflict. While it finds strong evidence for correlations between the four factors so far no conclusive
evidence has been presented as to the direction of causal links between the factors. This paper em-
ploys a country specific vector autoregressive model allowing for endogenous dynamic interactions
between trade, democracy, development and conflict. More specifically, it analyzes how shocks in
one of these variables affect the others over time to investigate ”what causes what”. The dataset
used covers 68 countries and the years 1960 to 2016. Results confirm the presence of simultaneous
effects from all variables on one another. In addition, effect size and sign is substantially hetero-
geneous across countries providing strong evidence against the validity of the homogeneous slope
parameter assumption. JEL codes: F14, F51, N40, O5, P45
1The authors would like to thank Scott Gates, Steffen Elstner, Matthias Hartmann and H˚avard Hegre.
All errors are our own. Authors are listed alphabetically. All work was shared equally.
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3.1 Introduction
The study of each of the bilateral relationships between democracy, development, trade
openness and armed conflict2 constitutes and entire field of research. In each of these
fields there is no consensus about the direction of the causal link. If there is one thing to
be taken away from this literature it is that democracy, development, trade openness and
armed conflict have shown to be endogenous to each other. This endogeneity should also
be accounted for in statistical models. Until now the literature has usually used two types
of models to examine the bilateral relationships: Either (dynamic) panel data models,
usually estimated with system or difference GMM approaches, but not accounting for the
indirect effects these four variables have on each other, or simultaneous equation models
which can take into account the indirect effects but do not contain autoregressive param-
eters. However, when it comes to factors like democracy, development, trade or conflict a
country’s state in the last period is of high importance in determining its current state.
At the same time, the past ten years have seen a global rise in nationalism and protection-
ism on the one hand, and an erosion of democratic norms in several countries on the other
hand. With it an understanding of the role of economic interdependence and democracy
for a peaceful interconnected world gains renewed importance: How does the international
system respond to changes in trade or in governance systems?
This paper employs a vector autoregressive (VAR) model that allows to control for theses
indirect effects. It models the dynamic relationships between democracy, development,
trade and conflict in a globalized world. More specifically, it analyzes how shocks in one
of these variables affect the others over time and examines the direction of effects for each
bilateral relationship. Impulse response functions are used to examine the effects. These
impulse response functions allow for contemporaneous correlation of errors and thereby
control for endogenous effects between the four factors.
The results provide two major insights: Firstly, they confirm that all variables affect each
other. Therefore, indirect effects must be accounted for in any project examining the
effect of one factor on another. Secondly, there is substantial heterogeneity in effect size
and direction across countries. This suggests that the homogeneity of slope parameters
2For readability and for brevity, this paper might refer to trade openness as ”trade” and to armed
conflict as ”conflict”. However, note that the underlying definitions of these terms correspond to how they
have been defined in Section 3.3.
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assumption frequently employed in classic fixed effects models in cross-country analysis is
inappropriate for capturing the effects of one of the variables on the others.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the mechanisms relevant
to the identification of effects in this paper. Variables and data used are introduced
in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 states the hypothesis to be tested and describes model and
identification strategy. Central findings are presented in Section 3.5. Model robustness
is assessed in Section 3.6. The findings are discussed in Section 3.7 which as well concludes.
3.2 Why endogeneity matters, or: Integrating the economic
and the political cycle
The interactions between democracy, development, trade and conflict are depicted graph-
ically in Figure 3.1: The right-hand side displays what is best described as a ”political
cycle” evolving around democracy, while on the left-hand side the ”economic cycle” evolves
around trade. Both cycles show how closely the four factors are interrelated. Economic
and political science literature have studied the endogeneity and causal bilateral relation-
ships between each possible pair of the four factors. The most important findings are
described in the following.
Trade and Development
Frankel & Romer (1999) point out the endogenous relationship between trade and devel-
opment. Using income per capita, the authors find that trade raises income. Others have
assessed the distributional consequences of trade: Helpman et al. (2010) find that aggregate
inequality increases when countries are nearly symmetric due to reinforced within-sector
effects, while Egger & Kreickemeier (2012) introduce intergroup-inequality and find that
while aggregate welfare increases, so does inequality within as well as between the groups.
The mechanism at work can be described as follows. Increasing trade makes a broader
selection of goods and services accessible for the population which also leads to knowledge
transfer, increased human capital and higher levels of development. In turn, human capital
is a crucial factor for trade, both in terms of imports as well as exports: Increased human
capital on the labor market leads to a rise in production possibilities concerning export
goods, while increasing income will boost spending capacity and demand for imported
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Figure 3.1: Mapping the endogenous interactions between trade, democracy, development
and conflict
economic
cycle 
political
cycle Democracy
Conflict
Trade
Development
Visualization: Christian Isachsen
goods (Yanikkaya 2003).
Trade and Conflict
Conflicts affect trade through different channels: Resources are redirected towards defense
expenditures - known as the guns vs. butter trade-off - (Anderton & Carter 2009, Anderson
& Marcouiller 2002), resources and goods are destroyed and production possibilities shrink
due to conflict, and future and present economic activities are disrupted (e.g. capital flight,
increase in transport costs, etc.) which leads to a decrease of material well-being (Long
2008). Overall, opportunity costs are rising if trade gains are lost: Utility and income
decrease if consumption shifts away from preferred goods and production shifts away from
areas of comparative advantage. Empirical studies have found mixed results depending
on conflict data used. Trade as well affects conflict: According to the liberal theory
trade promotes peace. While the majority of empiric literature supports liberal theory
(Blomberg & Hess 2006, Martin et al. 2008, Keshk et al. 2010), realists argue that trade
may also spark conflict (Barbieri & Levy 1999, Barbieri et al. 2009).
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Conflict and Development
Greed or vertical economic inequality may spur conflict (Collier & Hoeﬄer 2004). Further-
more, in conflict infrastructure is destroyed and water and sanitation points deteriorate.
Goods and services are not available in the same way as in times of peace. Living con-
ditions deteriorate, accompanied by an increase in diseases and malnutrition. The gap
between elites and population widens and inequality gets worse: The society is captured
in the conflict trap (Collier et al. 2003).
Democracy and Development
Lipset (1959) describes democracy as a system that forms a political culture of negotiation
and compromise. Within that framework, democracy acts as a system of redistribution of
income but also of increased education. In a democracy with constraints on the executive,
full participation and competitive elections, the elites are forced to produce the socially
optimal quantity (Baum & Lake 2003). This leads to indirect positive effects of demo-
cratic institutions on investments (Tavares & Wacziarg 2001, Lake & Baum 2001). This
stimulates human capital accumulation as well as labor productivity which in turn act as
an engine for economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2014, Boucekkine et al. 2016, Rodriguez
& Rodrik 2000). The relationship between democracy and development is reciprocal:
Enhancements in socio-economic development determine democracy but are as well an
outcome of it (Acemoglu et al. 2019, Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu 2008). A stable and
growing economy with increasing income will itself lead to a more educated population
demanding increased participation, redistribution of power, rights and income.
Democracy and Conflict
The vast democratic peace literature (see e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson 2005, Oneal et al.
1996, Gates et al. 1996, Mitchell et al. 1999) has shown that democracy is a system for
the peaceful resolution of conflict. Hegre (2014) gives a good overview on this part of the
literature. Conflicts in turn affect democracies with the impact being determined by the
type conflict. Boese (2015) shows for example, that revolutionary conflict over the past 50
years has had a positive effect on democracy. Acemoglu & Robinson (2005) show that the
distribution of power between elites and population play a critical role in the development
of a state towards democracy or dictatorship.
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Trade and Democracy
The liberal theory suggests that democracies trade more (Mansfield & Snyder 2002): On
the one hand, elites have less opportunities to extract protectionist rents, as democracies
tend to support rather the preferences of the greater part of the consumers than those of
a few producers (Tavares & Wacziarg 2001). Free trade in turn consolidates democracy.
It reduces protectionist rents and thereby reduces the incentives for authoritarian groups
to seek power. With increasing democracy, both exporter and importer signal compliance
with the rule of law, reliability in business processes and a higher product quality (Liu
& Ornelas 2014, Yu 2010). However, groups that benefit from protectionism often try to
impair politics via lobbying (Tavares & Wacziarg 2001).
Why democracy, development, trade and conflict?
The dynamic interactions between trade, development, democracy and conflict form cen-
tral pillars of the literature outlined above. In addition, Subramanian & Satyanath (2004)
find that trade openness, conflict and democracy are strongly (positively) correlated with
macroeconomic stability. Rodrik et al. (2004) model the interactions between trade open-
ness, democracy, geography and income to assess the relative impact of the three former
variables in determining income levels. The theoretical logic underlying their paper is very
close to the one applied here. The model used in our paper considers the same endogenous
variables and (due to the substantial effects of conflict found in the democratic and liberal
peace literature) adds conflict as an endogenous variable.3
Endogeneity
Given the amount of findings on any of these bilateral relationships two points suggest
themselves: First, the presence of simultaneous bilateral effects and second (through said
simultaneous direct effects) the presence of indirect effects. Both, in consequence lead
to interaction structures such as those in Figure 3.1. Several scholars have noted both,
indirect effects, e.g. Persson & Tabellini (2009), Tavares & Wacziarg (2001) Rodrik et al.
(2004), Baum & Lake (2003), and simultaneous effects, e.g. Persson & Tabellini (2009),
Rodrik et al. (2004), Russett & Oneal (2001). However, this article is the first systematic
3Since geography is a time-invariant characteristic it is captured in each country’s intercept in our
model.
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study that acknowledges both points and that allows for a) all four factors being jointly
determined, b) the factors to simultaneously affect each other and c) indirect effects in
their econometric specification.
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3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
In this paper V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index, v2x libdem, is used as a measure of
democracy.4 Bernhard et al. (2017) show that the operationalization of democracy affects
the results. A major drawback of the vast amount of empirical literature carried out on
the interrelationships between democracy and other variables is that several studies use
similar measure(s) of democracy (Altman et al. 2018, p. 14), most notably the Polity2
and Freedom House Index. Boese (forthcoming) provides a comprehensive introduction
into quantitative democracy measurement and a detailed overview of the empirical anal-
yses these two indices should not be employed for. She concludes that the comparatively
new democracy indices by the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem)5 were created to
answer to most of the problems posed by ”classic” democracy measures, such as Polity2
and Freedom House Index. Consequently, they substantially outperform them in terms
of measure validity and reliability (this includes, for example, their underlying definition
of democracy, their measurement scales or the theoretical justification of their respective
aggregation procedures). Therefore, V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index is employed in
this paper. Its democracy definition includes the dimensions participation, contestation
and constraints on the executive decision making authority.6
This paper uses the armed conflict categorization provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP). A conflict is coded as such once a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths
is reached. Armed conflict has four conflict sub-categories: Extra-systemic armed conflict,
interstate armed conflict, internal armed conflict and internationalized internal armed
conflict.7 Furthermore, the armed conflict category provides information on conflict in-
volvement of different sides to a conflict. To include all conflict observations a binary
variable was created that is equal to one once a country is involved in any type of conflict.
Thus, all conflict involvements - no matter on which side of the conflict a country stands
- are included.
Against the background of the country-level of analysis, economic interdependence is op-
erationalized as trade openness. Trade openness has been widely used as a measure of
economic integration (see e.g. Rodriguez & Rodrik 2000). Trade as percent of GDP is
4v2x libdem is taken from the V-Dem Dataset Version 7.1, Coppedge et al. (2017).
5The V-Dem indices are available since Lindberg et al. (2014).
6For a detailed introduction into democracy measurement as well as explanations of the concepts of
participation, contestation and constraints see for example Boese (forthcoming).
7The exact UCDP definitions of conflict types are provided in the Appendix
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taken from the World Bank Indicators, who define the indicator as follows: ”Trade is the
sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic
product.” Data is available as weighted average and on annual level.
Literature including variables on socio-economic development often uses GDP per capita.
Since this study includes trade openness as measure for economic interdependence and
hence as an economic measure, we abstract away from including a ”socio-economic” quan-
tification, but rather introduce a measure for development. We quantify development by
using the World Development Indicator ”Life expectancy at birth, female”. The indicator
is defined as ”the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.” Data is avail-
able as weighted average and on annual level. Mortality rates mirror the health conditions
of a country and are therefore a commonly used indicator for development.
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
The dataset used in the analysis covers 68 countries and the time perid 1960 to 2016, i.e.
3,876 observations (57 observations per country). The dataset is balanced.8 Table 3.2
provides the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables in the
estimation sample.
Instead of taking the pooled sample as a basis, Table 3.3 examines the panel means of
each country’s time series. The variation between country means is quite substantial, es-
pecially for trade openness: The highest country mean is around 330 units whereas the
country with the lowest mean displayed average trade openness levels of around 19. Since
the armed conflict variable is a dummy equal to one in conflict years the minimum (max-
imum) value in Table 3.3 shows the minimum (maximum) percent of years in the time
series a country was involved in armed conflict. The country with the lowest number of
years involved in conflict was involved 2% of the 57 years, i.e. one year. The country with
the highest number of years in armed conflict was involved during 89% of its time series
(equivalent to 51 years).
How did the country values vary within the panels over time? Table 3.4 shows that the
8A detailed list of countries and the respective regions included in the sample can be found in the
Appendix (see Table 40).
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for pooled estimation sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Liberal Democracy Index 40.84 29.76 1.22 90.34
Trade Openness 65.63 50.42 4.92 441.60
Life Expectancy, Female 66.49 12.58 29.28 87.14
Armed Conflict 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
within variation for each country is substantially lower than the variation between the
country averages for three of four variables (democracy, trade and development). In other
words, the countries in this sample rather differ from each other (in terms of their trade,
democracy or development levels) than each country’s values vary over their respective
time series. This heterogeneity of countries is remarkable and will be captured by the
model used in this paper.
3.4 Model and Estimation
Findings of previous studies provide a starting point for this study: They suggest the
presence of simultaneity, i.e. that trade, democracy, development and conflict each affect
one another bilaterally. For each bilateral relationship, studies exist showing that ”A
causes B” as well as ”B causes A”. Note, the four factors bilaterally affect each other
both directly as well as indirectly through the other variables. The model used in this
paper allows trade, democracy, development and conflict to be jointly determined and
captures the indirect effects. As such it provides a suitable econometric framework to test
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Development, democracy, trade and conflict simultaneously affect each other
Econometric implications of this hypothesis are the following: First, to avoid omitted vari-
able bias a model needs to include each of these factors. Second, imagine four separate
”one equation”-models of each of these variables with regressors consisting of lags and
current values of the other variables. In each of these equations neither the simultaneity
nor the indirect effects that the variables have on each other through a third or fourth
variable are accounted for. The errors are contemporaneously correlated across the four
equations. By examining orthogonalized shocks, this model allows for such a contempo-
raneous correlation of error terms. Examining these shocks will show whether there are
simultaneous effects from each variable on all others (once we account for indirect effects)
or whether there are bilateral relationships for which the effects solely run ”from A to
B” (and not vice versa). Is there a chronological order in which these factors affect each
CHAPTER 3. HETEROGENEITY MATTERS 63
Table 3.3: Variation between country means
Variable Std. Dev. Min Max
country means
Liberal Democracy Index 26.46 4.41 87.62
Trade Openness 46.32 19.14 330.71
Life Expectancy, Female 11.13 45.12 80.52
Armed Conflict 0.24 0.02 0.89
Table 3.4: Within country variation
Variable Std. Dev. Min Max
Liberal Democracy Index 13.98 -56.67 37.12
Trade Openness 20.70 -101.52 192.82
Life Expectancy, Female 6.00 -22.72 20.03
Armed Conflict 0.39 -0.89 0.98
The minimum (maximum) column refers to the lowest (highest) deviation a country ex-
hibited from its respective panel mean.
other? We assume that development and democracy are slow changing variables whereas
trade and conflict react to shocks much faster in comparison.
Two limitations imposed by the dataset are worth noting. First, the 68 countries used
in this study constitute but a part of the global system of states. For reasons of data
availability it is not possible to include further countries. Data availability, however, is
correlated with some of the four variables, most prominently conflict. Afghanistan, for
example, could not be included as it’s trade openness time series exhibited missing values
for 25 of the 57 years used in the analysis. Nevertheless, the estimation sample consists of
68 countries from all regions of the world and as such is ”as representative as possible”.
The second limitation is measure reliability. Socio-economic development is a latent fac-
tor difficult to measure. As such it is often measured in vastly differing ways. While we
cannot adjust data availability, we do control for different specifications of development in
the robustness checks section. Our main results are robust to these changes.
3.4.1 Reduced form VAR
The model used in this paper assumes that development, democracy, trade and conflict
are jointly determined. To test whether there are simultaneous effects between each other
the following reduced form VAR(4) model is estimated for each country i:
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yi,t = Ai,1yi,t−1 + ...+Ai,4yi,t−4 + κi + i,t, (3.1)
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 68}, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 57}
where yi,t = (developmenti,t, democracyi,t, tradei,t, conflicti,t)
′ is a 4x1 vector of depen-
dent variables, Ai,1, ..., Ai,4 are 4x4 matrices of lag coefficients to be estimated and i,t is
a 4x1 white noise process. To keep the model parsimonious the 4x1 vector κi is the sole
exogenous regressor (this permits a nonzero mean E[yi, t]). With this model specification
all current period measures of democracy, development, conflict and trade are a function
of past values of each other. Hence, the total reduced-form effect that a past increase in,
for example, democracy had on each of the other dependent variables can be calculated
and orthogonalized effects can be examined over time.
The number of lagged values to include in the equation deserves some attention. The data
used in this paper is in annual format. Including one lag hence is equivalent to adding an
entire year of information to the model (in light of the slow changing nature of variables
such as democracy or development this is a fair amount of time). To make sure that even
a more volatile measure such as trade openness is appropriately captured in the VAR
model a lag length of 4 years is selected.9 From a theoretical perspective, four years is an
appropriate lag length choice as it is the average electoral period length in the countries
under study. Standard Information Criteria (AIC, adjusted R2) presented in Section 3.6
confirm this choice of lag length.
The following three assumptions on the error term are central for this model:
E[i,t] = 0, E[i,t
′
i,t] = Σ and E[i,t
′
i,s] = 0, for t 6= s
Through the non-singular matrix Σ the error terms are allowed to be contemporaneously
correlated. However, they must be uncorrelated with their lags and lead values as well as
all right-hand side variables of the model.
Given the high amount of variation across countries (rather than within each countries
9Robustness checks with up to ten lags can be found in the Appendix. The results do not change.
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time series)10 the VAR(4) model is estimated country by country. This permits the slope
parameters to be heterogeneous across countries. In most cross-country analyses using
panel data slope parameters are assumed to be homogeneous across countries and system-
atic differences between countries are assumed to be captured through country specific
fixed effects. Through estimating our model country-by-country it provides the slope pa-
rameters with the possibility to differ (i.e. the coefficients have the option to differ as
much as to be homogeneous across countries) while including a country specific intercept,
κi. In that sense the model is an extension of above mentioned panel data models.
Using impulse response functions the dynamic relationships between democracy, develop-
ment, economic interdependence and conflict can be depicted graphically. To derive them,
it is useful to transform model (3.1) in its Vector Moving Average, VMA(∞), representa-
tion:
yi,t = Ai,1yi,t−1 + ...+Ai,4yi,t−4 + κi + i,t
= Ai,1Lyi,t + ...+Ai,4L
4yi,t + κi + i,t
(I −Ai,1L− ...−Ai,4L4)yi,t = κi + i,t
Let the lag polinomial Φi,4(L) := I −Ai,1L− ...−Ai,4L4 then
yi,t = Φi,4(L)
−1κi + Φi,4(L)−1i,t (3.2)
For Φi,4(L)
−1 to exist, |Φi,4(L)| 6= 0. Φi,4(L)−1κi = µi where E[yi,t] = µi (there is no
t-subscript as the process is stationary)
yi,t = µi +
∞∑
s=0
θsi,t−s (3.3)
where θ0 = I ans θs is a function of Φi,4(L). This Vector Moving Average, VMA(∞),
representation is the basis upon which impulse response functions are created. The effect
of the shocks i,t on Yi,t are now captured by
10See Section 3.3.1.
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δyi,t
δi,t−s
= θsi (3.4)
and can be interpreted as the effects of a shock in one variable on the others over time.
Note that yi,t and i,t−s are 4x1 vectors. This allows us to calculate the response of the
n− th element in y to a shock in the m− th element.
The impulse response functions depict the following situation: In the first period there is a
one period (in this framework: one-year) positive shock with a magnitude of one standard
deviation in the impulse variable. All other/response variables are set to their mean values
in the first period. The impulse response graphs (see for example Figure 3.3 or Section C.3
of the Appendix) show the response variable’s deviation from its mean in each year after
the positive shock of the impulse variable in the first period. The solid line represents the
point estimate of the response. The dashed lines highlight a 95 percent confidence band
around that estimate. This paper focuses on responses to shocks over a ten year period.
3.4.2 Structural VAR
Given that the error terms are contemporaneously correlated in model (3.1) the estimated
parameter values therein are impossible to interpret and further identifying assumptions
are necessary. These assumptions in our case are that development and democracy are (in
comparison to trade and conflict) slow changing variables, i.e. a shock in development or
democracy will have an effect on trade and conflict in the same period while democracy
and development will take time in responding to a shock in trade or conflict. Therefore,
we assume the following ordering: Development, democracy, conflict and trade.11 That
means development affects all other factors contemporaneously, but is not contempora-
neously affected by shocks in the other variables. Democracy affects conflict and trade
contemporaneously and is affected only by contemporaneous shocks of development and
so on.
From an econometric perspective implementing these assumptions means model 3.1 needs
to be orthogonalized (to obtain a variance-covariance matrix of error terms with orthogo-
11As Robustness Checks results for a different ordering are reported in Section 3.6.
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nalized zero off-diagonal elements). This paper uses a Choletsky decomposition, i.e.:
Cyi,t = CAi,1yi,t−1 + ...+ CAi,4yi,t−4 + Cκi + Ci,t, (3.5)
where Ci,t = ui,t and V ar[ui,t] = Σu = σ
2
uiI.
This structural VAR(4) model is then transformed into its VMA(∞) representations and
the impulse response functions are calculated as discussed above. The next section sum-
marizes the main findings from these orthogonalized impulse response functions.
3.5 Results
The hypothesis to examine is that simultaneous effects from variable A to variable B as
well as from B to A are present. As there are four endogenous variables, there are 6
bilateral relationships to examine: 1. trade and democracy, 2. trade and development,
3. trade and conflict, 4. development and democracy, 5. development and conflict and 6.
democracy and conflict. Each bilateral relationship consists of two parts: A affects B and
B affects A. If the impulse response functions display significant effects for both of these
parts simultaneous effects are present and the hypothesis can be accepted.
The VAR(4) model is estimated and impulse response functions are calculated for each
country, i.e. 68 times. There is one impulse response function for every country (68) and
every bilateral relationship part (6 · 2 = 12), i.e. per model specification 68 · 12 = 816 im-
pulse response functions are calculated. The question of how to aggregate the information
contained in these functions to a displayable level is not trivial. To test our hypothesis
for each part of the bilateral relationship the number of countries exhibiting a significant
effect is of immediate interest. Therefore, Figure 3.2 displays the number of countries with
significantly positive and negative (and no) results for each impulse-response combination.
Each cell of the table constitutes one part of a bilateral relationship.12
Figure 3.2 provides two fundamental insights: First, it suggests the hypothesis is true
- simultaneous effects between all variables exist. For all combinations of variables ”A
12Note, that the question ”how does a variable respond to shocks in itself?” is not part of this anal-
ysis. The corresponding impulse response combinations are reported in Figure 3.2 solely for the sake of
completeness.
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affects B” as well as ”B affects A”. This is crucial. Any model estimating the effect of
one of these variables on another has to account for the simultaneous relationships as well
as the indirect effects. Second, for all impulse-response combinations there are positive
as well as negative responses, i.e. the effects that these variables have on one another are
far from homogeneous across countries. For each part of the bilateral relationships the
responses differ across countries in terms of effect sign, magnitude and timing. Section C.3
of the Appendix contains the impulse response functions (as well as a discussion thereof)
for countries with significant responses ordered by bilateral relationship. In fact, the re-
sponses are not even homogeneous within regions. Section C.2 of the Appendix shows that
aggregating the impulse response functions on even a regional level disguises the variations
contained within the country responses. A similar effect would occur had this model been
estimated under a homogeneous slope parameter assumption.
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The sole part of a bilateral relationship for which there is an overwhelmingly positive effect
is that of development on trade openness. There are only three countries for which a one
period one standard deviation positive shock in development leads to negative responses:
The Central African Republic, Uruguay and Nicaragua (see Figure 8). The substantial
magnitude of the negative effect suggests that cross-country heterogeneity in responses
cannot be neglected for this bilateral relationship either.
As depicted in Figure 3.2, even within one country the effect of a shock can be hetero-
geneous over time. In Kenya, for example, a one period one standard deviation positive
shock in development leads to a significant positive effect for trade openness within the
first three periods but switches to a significant negative and lasting effect in period six.
For Portugal, a shock in development has the reverse effect: Within the first three pe-
riods, trade is affected negatively, but switches to a positive effect in period six. These
switches can be observed across regions and in the bilateral relationships between conflict
and trade, development and democracy, and conflict and democracy.
3.6 Robustness Checks
How sensitive are these results to the identifying assumption and the model specification?
To answer this question the model was re-estimated with six different specifications all of
which are discussed in the remainder of this section.
In any VAR model the choice of lag length deserves attention. The baseline model of this
paper was run with a lag length of four years since this approximately equals the average
electoral period. To determine whether this lag selection is appropriate, several avenues
were pursued: First, standard autocorrelation tests, such as the LM-test (Null hypothesis:
No serial correlation of order 1-4) were consulted. As to be expected in a cross country
setting such as this one autocorrelation is present in some of the countries. Eyeballing
the residual plots for these countries (provided in Section C.5) suggest no systematic pres-
ence of heavy autocorrelation. Nevertheless, to make sure autocorrelation is negligible the
VAR(4) model was re-estimated in first differences. Although the number of countries
displaying significant results is smaller (see Figure 29 of the Appendix) the same simulta-
neous effects as well as country specific heterogeneity in effect magnitude, timing and sign
are visible. Comparing standard goodness-of-fit criteria for the baseline VAR(4) model in
levels (Table 3.7) and in first difference (Table 3.5) confirms the VAR(4) specification in
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Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions with switches in signs
Impulse response functions for Kenya and Portugal displaying a switch from a significant
positive effect of democracy on trade to a significant negative effect and vice versa.
levels. In the presence of autocorrelation an alternative option is to increase lag length.
Therefore, the model was re-estimated as a VAR(8) and VAR(10) model. The responses
remain heterogeneous across countries and the effects still appear simultaneously for both
parts of each bilateral relationship (see Figure 33 for VAR(8) and Figure 34 for VAR(10)).
Comparing model fit across these three lag specifications (see Table 3.6) suggests that
longer lag specification yield better fits. However, with increasing lag length four coun-
tries must be dropped from the analysis because of colinearity in the variables. To include
the highest number of countries possible and since the results remain robust the lag length
of four remains the preferred specification.
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Table 3.5: Model fit for model in first differences
model in first differences
Dep. Var. Obs. adj. R2 AIC
development 68.00 0.71 -4.92
(0.43) (3.71)
democracy 68.00 0.11 4.51
(0.23) (1.71)
conflict 68.00 0.20 0.40
(0.22) (0.78)
trade 68.00 0.07 -1.64
(0.17) (0.88)
Overall -1.86
(3.19)
”Obs.” refers to the number of countries in the analysis. Values reported for adjusted R2
and AIC by equation are pooled averages. Standard deviations are reported below each
cell.
Table 3.6: Comparison of model fit across different lag specifications
Baseline VAR(4) Lag length 8 Lag length 10
Dep. Var. Obs. adj. R2 AIC Obs. adjusted R2 AIC Obs. adjusted R2 AIC
development 68 1.00 -5.02 64 0.13 -5.26 64 1.00 -6.27
(0.01) (3.75) (0.19) (3.91) (0.01) (3.94)
democracy 68 0.90 4.34 64 0.89 4.05 64 0.92 3.03
(0.11) (1.69) (0.11) (1.79) (0.10) (1.93)
conflict 68 0.45 0.22 64 0.39 0.09 64 0.58 -0.90
(0.29) (0.74) (0.35) (0.86) (0.37) (1.48)
trade 68 0.83 -1.79 64 0.82 -1.96 64 0.87 -2.80
(0.13) (0.85) (0.14) (0.83) (0.15) (0.94)
Overall AIC -2.48 -3.69 -9.09
(3.23) (3.73) (4.63)
”Obs.” refers to the number of countries in the analysis. Values reported for adjusted R2
and AIC by equation are pooled averages. Standard deviations are reported below each
cell.
By choosing female life expectancy as a measure of development this paper deviates slightly
from common approaches to measuring development, namely by GDP-related variables.
As robustness checks the model was re-estimated using once GDP per capita growth and
once logged GDP per capita as measures of development. Before discussing the results
it is worth remembering (see Section 3.3) that GDP is included in the measure of trade
openness used in this paper:
tradet =
(exportst + importst)
GDPt
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This implies that
δtradet
δGDPt
= −(exportst + importst)
GDP 2t
< 0, if exportst + importst > 0 and GDPt 6= 0
as well as
δGDPt
δtradet
= −(exportst + importst)
trade2t
< 0, if exportst + importst > 0 and tradet 6= 0
GDP per capita growth and logged GDP per capita are defined as
growtht =
GDPpct −GDPpct−1
GDPpct−1
and lnGPDpct = ln(GDPpct)
Assuming that GDPpc is a function positively increasing in GDP the shocks examined in
this paper would (ceteris paribus) and by pure definition of variables be expected to have
the following effects: A positive shock in development, measured by growtht or lnGDPpct,
would correspond to an increase in GDP per capita (and consequently in GDP) leading
to a decrease in tradet. Conversely a shock in trade openness implies a reduction in GDP
and with it a reduction in lnGDPpct and growtht, respectively. Interestingly, for both
specifications (using growtht or lnGDPpct) positive responses to shocks in trade as well
as to shocks in development are clearly visible. The number of countries with trade values
responding negatively to shocks in development increases substantially in comparison to
the VAR(4) model, which was to be expected given the definition of the variables. The
number of countries exhibiting significant results is smaller when the GDP per capita
growth specification is employed, which is also unsurprising since it is a growth rather
than a levels variable (the response of development to a shock in trade, for example is
closer to the baseline VAR(4) result for the lnGDPpct specification than for the growtht
specification). According to the information criteria presented in Table 3.7 across different
specifications of development baseline VAR(4) remains the preferred specification.
The ordering of the variables in the Choletsky decomposition represents a central identify-
ing assumption of the structural VAR. To assess the model’s sensitivity to this assumption
a Choletsky-decomposition was employed and impulse response function were calculated
using the alternative ordering: Democracy, development, trade and conflict.13 The results
13The two slow changing variables were switched and so were the two fast changing variables. Deviating
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Table 3.7: Comparison of model fit for different specifications of development
Baseline VAR(4) GDP p.c. growth log GDP p.c.
Dep. Var. Obs. adj. R2 AIC Obs. adj. R2 AIC Obs. adj. R2 AIC
development 68 1.00 -5.02 67 0.13 8.02 68 0.97 -1.35
(0.01) (3.75) (0.19) (0.76) (0.05) (0.75)
democracy 68 0.90 4.34 67 0.89 4.41 68 0.90 4.35
(0.11) (1.69) (0.11) (1.73) (0.10) (1.70)
conflict 68 0.45 0.22 67 0.39 0.29 68 0.40 0.25
(0.29) (0.74) (0.35) (0.75) (0.34) (0.74)
trade 68 0.83 -1.79 67 0.82 -1.74 68 0.83 -1.77
(0.13) (0.85) (0.14) (0.84) (0.15) (0.84)
Overall AIC -2.48 10.72 1.20
(3.23) (2.75) (2.71)
”Obs.” refers to the number of countries in the analysis. Values reported for adjusted R2
and AIC by equation are pooled averages. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses
below each cell.
(see Figure 30) remain very similar.
3.7 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper estimates the simultaneous effects of trade openness, democracy, armed conflict
and development on each other by employing a VAR model. The previous section confirms
that the results are robust to a number of different model specifications and that standard
information criteria confirm the model choice. The two central findings obtained are: i.
the prevalence of simultaneous effects between development, democracy, trade and conflict
and ii. the substantial heterogeneity in responses across and even within countries. These
findings partially explain as to why the literature so far displayed findings in favor of each
direction: First, because the effects are mixed and impacts run both ways of each bilateral
relationship. Second, the contemporaneous determination of the four factors needs to be
accounted for econometrically. Third, heterogeneity of responses across countries and over
time needs to be allowed for.
A large part of the literature has accounted for simultaneity in the bilateral study of each
of the four factors by, e.g. the use of lags, fixed effects, simultaneous equation models
or IV approaches (see e.g. Rigobon & Rodrik 2005, Martin et al. 2008). However, the
present study proves that solely examining bilateral relationships without controlling for
from the slow- and fast-changing setup (i.e. ordering the variables with trade (or conflict) as first or
second variable in the VAR) would imply that the a slow changing variable like democracy or development
responded to a shock in trade (or conflict) within that same period, which seems unreasonable.
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time-varying other influences is not enough (as seen e.g. in Frankel & Romer 1999, Ace-
moglu et al. 2019). Simultaneous effects of more than two factors have to be accounted for.
Furthermore, the results of this paper strongly advocate against the widely assumed ho-
mogeneity of slope parameters. Section C.3 of the Appendix thoroughly discusses the
variation of effects across countries. This is especially important in the study of these four
factors, as a lot of research tries to establish ”one result fits all” findings. In this regard,
the present study has to disagree with recent aggregate findings such as that democracy
causes growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019), democracy does not cause growth (Pozuelo et al.
2016) or trade promotes peace (Hegre et al. 2010). Additionally, this finding touches upon
ideological grounds: Institutions like the World Bank as well as OECD and other advo-
cates for the liberal cause untiringly and unceasingly insist that trade aids development,
reduces conflict and helps to establish democracy (Rodriguez & Rodrik 2000). This paper
finds that they are all right, but at the same time, they are all wrong: All depends on the
country you are looking at.
This finding of heterogeneous effects is in line with the results of the studies that relax the
homogeneous slope parameter assumption (to different degrees),14 most notably Cervellati
et al. (2014). Cervellati et al. (2014) replicate a seminal study, Acemoglu et al. (2008),
which finds a robust null-effect of development (income) on democracy once country fixed
effects are included. In their replication Cervellati et al. (2014) find that once the effects
of income on democracy are allowed to differ across countries there is substantial het-
erogeneity in slope parameters. They conclude that this heterogeneity (and with it the
wide range of point estimates of slope parameters across countries) can provide a plausible
reason for the null-result in Acemoglu et al. (2008) or any model assuming homogeneity
of slope parameters in this context.
Additionally, hetereogeneity is not limited to the cross-section, but also is important on
the within-country level - as discussed in Section 3.5 and shown in Table 3.4. This finding
is another valid argument against the homogeneous slope parameter assumption on the
one hand, but as well for the incorporation of heterogeneity over time.
Certain limitations to the model are worth noting. First, in the interest of parsimony no
14See for example Rigobon & Rodrik (2005), Narayan et al. (2011).
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exogenous control variables are added. The number of possible extensions to this model
is limited by page-restrictions only. In future research, an interesting approach would be,
for example, to expand on the conflict dimension. The conflict category used in this paper
consists of several quite different forms of conflict. This aggregate measure hides the het-
erogeneous effects of different conflict types (see Kamin n.d.). Such conflict types could
be added to the model one by one as well as a location variable indicating whether a given
country was the location of a conflict in a given year or not. Secondly, for a better un-
derstanding of bilateral trade and bilateral conflict, the country-year format employed in
this paper could be extended into a country-pair-year format. Bilateral trade and conflict
heavily depend on country pair characteristics. Including such information in the model
would be an interesting extension.
Appendices
A Appendix Chapter 1
The tables in this Appendix are also online (see Boese & Kamin 2018a,b, which provide
a much more detailed overview of which countries and years actually contain nonmissing
values in each of the datasets).
A.1 Democracy Datasets Comparison
See Boese & Kamin (2018a) for a very detailed listing of all countries and their respective
time series covered. Countries for which only the names/labels differ are listed in Table 8
(that is, countries of inconsistency type 3, reason 1.). In the worksheet “Overview” (Boese
and Kamin, 2018a), these countries are highlighted in grey.
Table 8: Countries for which only the names/labels differ.
V-Dem Version 8 Polity IV, Version 2016
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia
Burma/Myanmar Myanmar (Burma)
Democratic Republic of Congo Congo Kinshasa
German Democratic Republic Germany East
North Korea Korea North
Piedmont-Sardinia Sardinia
Republic of Vietnam Vietnam South
Republic of the Congo Congo Brazzaville
Slovakia Slovak Republic
South Korea Korea South
South Yemen Yemen South
United Arab Emirates UAE
United States of America United States
Wu¨rtemberg Wuerttemburg
Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other dataset are
listed in Table 9. A “perfect match” refers to a counterpart in terms of names and years
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(and potentially borders). This includes countries of inconsistency types 1 and 3. Coun-
tries representing the same or similar historical units are grouped.
Countries unmergable due to name and time inconsistencies are listed in Table 10. This
includes countries of inconsistency type 3. Note: # obs=number of observations; N=total
number of available observations in data; missing=number of missing years/observations
for given country between its first and last year.
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Table 9: Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other
dataset
V-Dem Version 8 Polity IV, Version 2016
Barbados
Brunswick
Colombia Colombia
Gran Colombia
Czech Republic Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Vietnam North
Vietnam
German Democratic Republic Germany East
Germany Germany
Prussia
Germany West
Guatemala United Province of CA (Central America)
Hamburg
Hanover
Hesse-Darmstadt
Hesse-Kassel
Hong Kong
Iceland
Ivory Coast Ivory Coast
Cote D’Ivoire
Maldives
Mecklenburg Schwerin
Nassau
Oldenburg
Orange Free State
Palestine/British Mandate
Palestine/Gaza
Palestine/West Bank
Russia USSR
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach
Serbia Serbia
Serbia and Montenegro
Yugoslavia
Seychelles
Somaliland
South Korea Korea South
Korea
South Sudan South Sudan
Sudan Sudan
Sudan-North
Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe
Timor-Leste Timor Leste
East Timor
Vanuatu
Yemen Yemen
Yemen North
Zanzibar
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Table 10: Countries unmergeable due to name and time inconsistencies
V-Dem Version 8, 201 countries Polity IV, Version 2016, 195 countries
year # obs. in data year # obs. in data
country first last N missing country first last N missing
Bosnia and 1992 2017 26 0 Bosnia 1992 2016 25 0
Herzegovina Yugoslavia 1921 2002 83 -1
Colombia 1789 2017 229 0 Colombia 1832 2016 185 0
Gran Colombia 1821 1832 12 0
Czech Republic 1918 2017 100 0 Czech Republic 1993 2016 24 0
Czechoslovakia 1918 1992 75 0
Democratic Republic 1945 2017 73 0 Vietnam North 1954 1976 23 0
of Vietnam Vietnam 1976 2016 41 0
Germany 1789 2017 225 4 Germany 1868 2016 105 44
Prussia 1800 1867 68 0
Germany West 1945 1990 46 0
Ivory Coast 1900 2017 118 0 Ivory Coast 1960 2015 56 0
Cote D’Ivoire 2016 2016 1 0
Russia 1789 2017 229 0 Russia 1800 2016 148 69
USSR 1922 1991 70 0
Serbia 1804 2017 213 1 Serbia 1830 2016 102 85
Serbia and 2003 2006 4 0
Montenegro
South Korea 1789 2017 229 0 Korea South 1948 2016 69 0
Korea 1800 1910 111 0
Sudan 1900 2017 118 0 Sudan 1956 2011 56 0
Sudan-North 2011 2016 6 0
South Yemen 1900 1990 91 0 Yemen South 1967 1990 24 0
Yemen 1789 2017 162 67 Yemen 1990 2016 27 0
Yemen North 1918 1990 73 0
Timor-Leste 1900 2017 118 0 Timor Leste 2016 2016 1 0
East Timor 2002 2015 14 0
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A.2 Economic Datasets Comparison
Table 11 is a listing of unmergeable names/labels in the UN Comtrade and WDI datasets,
due to inconsistency type 3, and shows a large share of countries with high export levels
(Boese and Kamin, 2018b, contains the list sorted by total exports; worksheet “Unmer-
gable Outliers Comtrade”. The spreadsheet also provides a list of country groups/regions
which were not included in the comparison; worksheet “Disregarded Country Groups”).
Tables 12 and 13 show countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match
in the other dataset. A “perfect match” refers to a counterpart in terms of names and
years (and potentially borders). This includes countries of inconsistency types 1 and 3.
Countries representing the same or similar historical units are grouped.
Table 14 shows countries unmergable due to name and time inconsistencies. This includes
countries of inconsistency type 3 (N=total number of available observations in data).
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Table 11: Countries for which the names/labels differ
UN Comtrade exports WDI trade openness
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Bolivia
Bosnia Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cabo Verde Cape Verde
Cayman Isds Cayman Islands
Central African Rep. Central African Republic
China, Hong Kong SAR Hong Kong
China, Macao SAR Macao SAR, China
Congo Republic of the Congo
Czechia Czech Republic
Coˆte d’Ivoire Ivory Coast
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Democratic Republic of Congo
Dominican Rep. Dominican Republic
FS Micronesia Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Faeroe Isds Faroe Islands
Gambia The Gambia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Laos
Myanmar Burma/Myanmar
Rep. of Korea South Korea
Rep. of Moldova Moldova
Russian Federation Russia
Saint Kitts and Nevis St. Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia St. Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe
Solomon Isds Solomon Islands
TFYR of Macedonia Macedonia
Turks and Caicos Isds Turks and Caicos Islands
US Virgin Isds Virgin Islands (U.S.)
USA United States of America
United Rep. of Tanzania Tanzania
Viet Nam Vietnam
Yemen Yemen, Rep.
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Table 12: Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other
dataset, A-R
UN Comtrade exports WDI trade openness
American Samoa
Belgium Belgium
Belgium-Luxembourg
British Virgin Islands
Channel Islands
Cook Isds
Curacao
Czechia Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia
East and West Pakistan
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia Ethiopia
Fmr Ethiopia
Fmr Tanganyika
Fmr Yugoslavia
French Guiana
Germany Germany
Fmr Dem. Rep. of Germany
Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany
Gibraltar
Guadeloupe
Guam
India India
India, excl. Sikkim
Isle of Man
Kosovo
Liechtenstein
Marshall Islands
Mayotte
Monaco
Montserrat
Nauru
Neth. Antilles
Neth. Antilles and Aruba
Niue
North Korea
Northern Mariana Islands
Panama Panama
Fmr Panama, excl.Canal Zone
Peninsula Malaysia
Puerto Rico
Re´union
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Table 13: Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other
dataset, S-Z
UN Comtrade exports WDI trade openness
Sabah
Saint Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
San Marino
Serbia and Montenegro
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
State of Palestine
St. Martin (French part)
Sudan Sudan
Fmr Sudan
South Sudan
USA United States of America
USA (before 1981)
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam Vietnam
Fmr Rep. of Vietnam
Yemen Yemen, Rep.
Fmr Arab Rep. of Yemen
West Bank and Gaza
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Table 14: Countries unmergeable due to name and time inconsistencies
UN Comtrade exports years available WDI tradeopenness years available
(coded and non-missing) (coded and non-missing)
country year N country year N
first last first last
Belgium 1999 2017 19 Belgium 1960 2016 57
Belgium-Luxembourg 1962 1998 30
Bosnia Herzegovina 2003 2017 15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2016 23
Czechia 1993 2017 24 Czech Republic 1990 2016 27
Czechoslovakia 1968 1987 20
Pakistan 1972 2017 31 Pakistan 1967 2016 50
East and West Pakistan 1962 1971 10
Ethiopia 1995 2016 21 Ethiopia 2011 2016 6
Fmr Ethiopia 1962 1987 21
Fmr Yugoslavia 1962 1987 26
Germany 1991 2017 27 Germany 1970 2016 47
Fmr Dem. Rep. of Germany 1985 1987 3
Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany 1962 1990 29
India 1975 2017 43 India 1960 2016 57
India, excl. Sikkim 1962 1974 13
Panama 1978 2016 32 Panama 1960 2016 57
Fmr Panama, excl.Canal Zone 1962 1977 16
Serbia 2005 2017 13 Serbia 1995 2016 22
Serbia and Montenegro 1992 2004 9
State of Palestine 2007 2016 10
West Bank and Gaza 1994 2016 23
Sudan 2012 2015 2 Sudan 1960 2016 57
Fmr Sudan 1963 2011 37
South Sudan 2008 2015 8
Viet Nam 2000 2016 17 Vietnam 1986 2016 31
Fmr Rep. of Vietnam 1963 1973 11
Yemen 2004 2015 12 Yemen, Rep. 1990 2016 27
Fmr Arab Rep. of Yemen 1975 1981 6
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A.3 Conflict Dataset
Tables 15 to 19 provide a comparison of country coding units in the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict dataset 18.1 to the coding units supplied in the relevant code book. Countries
with inconsistent labels are written in blue; countries which only exist in the dataset but
not in code book are written in red.
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Table 15: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset
18.1 and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, A-Co
Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
Afghanistan 1978 2017 47 Afghanistan 1946 2012
Albania 1946 1946 2 Albania 1946 2012
Algeria 1963 2017 30 Algeria 1962 2012
Angola 1975 2017 36 Angola 1975 2012
Argentina 1955 1982 8 Argentina 1946 2012
Armenia 1991 2012
Australia 2003 2003 2 Australia 1946 2012
Austria 1946 2012
Azerbaijan 1991 2017 15 Azerbaijan 1991 2012
Bahamas 1973 2012
Bahrain 1971 2012
Bangladesh 1975 2017 21 Bangladesh 1971 2012
Barbados 1966 2012
Belarus (Byelorussia) 1991 2012
Belgium 1946 2012
Belize 1981 2012
Benin 1960 2012
Bhutan 1949 2012
Bolivia 1946 1967 3 Bolivia 1946 2012
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 1995 9 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 2012
Botswana 1966 2012
Brazil 1946 2012
Brunei 1984 2012
Bulgaria 1946 2012
Burkina Faso 1985 1987 3 Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 1960 2012
Burundi 1965 2015 19 Burundi 1962 2012
Cambodia (Kampuchea) 1967 2011 42 Cambodia (Kampuchea) 1953 2012
Cameroon 1960 2017 10 Cameroon 1960 2012
Canada 1946 2012
Cape Verde 1975 2012
Central African Republic 2001 2013 8 Central African Republic 1960 2012
Chad 1966 2017 43 Chad 1960 2012
Chile 1973 1973 1 Chile 1946 2012
China 1946 2008 45 China 1946 2012
Colombia 1964 2016 53 Colombia 1946 2012
Comoros 1989 1997 2 Comoros 1975 2012
Congo 1993 2016 6 Congo 1960 2012
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Table 16: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset
18.1 and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, Co-Ira
Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
DR Congo (Zaire) 1960 2017 30 Congo, Democratic 1960 2012
Republic of (Zaire)
Costa Rica 1948 1948 1 Costa Rica 1946 2012
Ivory Coast 2002 2011 4 Cote D’Ivoire 1960 2012
Croatia 1992 1995 3 Croatia 1991 2012
Cuba 1953 1961 5 Cuba 1946 2012
Cyprus 1974 1974 2 Cyprus 1960 2012
Czech Republic 1993 2012
Czechoslovakia 1946 1992
Denmark 1946 2012
Djibouti 1991 2008 7 Djibouti 1977 2012
Dominican Republic 1965 1965 1 Dominican Republic 1946 2012
East Timor 2002 2012
Ecuador 1995 1995 2 Ecuador 1946 2012
Egypt 1948 2017 29 Egypt 1946 2012
El Salvador 1969 1991 16 El Salvador 1946 2012
Equatorial Guinea 1968 2012
Eritrea 1997 2016 12 Eritrea 1993 2012
Estonia 1991 2012
Ethiopia 1960 2016 131 Ethiopia 1946 2012
Fiji 1970 2012
Finland 1946 2012
France 1946 1962 55 France 1946 2012
Gabon 1964 1964 1 Gabon 1960 2012
Gambia 1981 1981 1 Gambia 1965 2012
Georgia 1991 2008 8 Georgia 1991 2012
German Democratic Republic 1949 1990
German Federal Republic 1949 2012
Ghana 1966 1983 3 Ghana 1957 2012
Greece 1946 1949 4 Greece 1946 2012
Grenada 1983 1983 2
Guatemala 1949 1995 34 Guatemala 1946 2012
Guinea 2000 2001 2 Guinea 1958 2012
Guinea-Bissau 1998 1999 2 Guinea-Bissau 1974 2012
Guyana 1966 2012
Haiti 1989 2004 3 Haiti 1946 2012
Honduras 1957 1969 3 Honduras 1946 2012
Hungary 1956 1956 2 Hungary 1946 2012
Hyderabad 1947 1948 4
Iceland 1946 2012
India 1948 2017 220 India 1947 2012
Indonesia 1950 2005 52 Indonesia 1946 2012
Iran 1946 2017 62 Iran (Persia) 1946 2012
Iraq 1948 2017 78 Iraq 1946 2012
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Table 17: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset
18.1 and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, Ire-O
Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
Ireland 1946 2012
Israel 1948 2014 86 Israel 1948 2012
Italy/Sardinia 1946 2012
Jamaica 1962 2012
Japan 1946 2012
Jordan 1948 2016 6 Jordan 1946 2012
Kazakhstan 1991 2012
Kenya 1982 2017 4 Kenya 1963 2012
Kosovo 2008 2012
Kuwait 1990 1991 2 Kuwait 1961 2012
Kyrgyz Republic 1991 2012
Laos 1959 1990 22 Laos 1954 2012
Latvia 1991 2012
Lebanon 1948 2017 17 Lebanon 1946 2012
Lesotho 1998 1998 1 Lesotho 1966 2012
Liberia 1980 2003 7 Liberia 1946 2012
Libya 1987 2017 8 Libya 1951 2012
Lithuania 1991 2012
Luxembourg 1946 2012
Macedonia, FYR 2001 2001 1 Macedonia (FRY) 1991 2012
Madagascar 1971 1971 1 Madagascar (Malagasy) 1960 2012
Malawi 1964 2012
Malaysia 1958 2013 15 Malaysia 1957 2012
Maldives 1965 2012
Mali 1985 2017 18 Mali 1960 2012
Malta 1964 2012
Mauritania 1975 2011 6 Mauritania 1960 2012
Mauritius 1968 2012
Mexico 1994 1996 2 Mexico 1946 2012
Moldova 1992 1992 1 Moldova 1991 2012
Mongolia 1946 2012
Montenegro 2006 2012
Morocco 1963 1989 17 Morocco 1956 2012
Mozambique 1977 2016 18 Mozambique 1975 2012
Myanmar (Burma) 1948 2017 275 Myanmar (Burma) 1948 2012
Namibia 1990 2012
Nepal 1960 2006 14 Nepal 1946 2012
Netherlands 1946 1962 5 Netherlands 1946 2012
New Zealand 1946 2012
Nicaragua 1957 1990 13 Nicaragua 1946 2012
Niger 1991 2017 10 Niger 1960 2012
Nigeria 1966 2017 20 Nigeria 1960 2012
North Korea 1949 1953 10 North Korea 1948 2012
Norway 1946 2012
Oman 1957 1975 8 Oman 1946 2012
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Table 18: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset
18.1 and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, P-T
Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
Pakistan 1948 2017 55 Pakistan 1947 2012
Panama 1989 1989 3 Panama 1946 2012
Papua New Guinea 1990 1996 6 Papua New Guinea 1975 2012
Paraguay 1947 1989 3 Paraguay 1946 2012
Peru 1965 2010 24 Peru 1946 2012
Philippines 1946 2017 104 Philippines 1946 2012
Poland 1946 2012
Portugal 1961 1974 36 Portugal 1946 2012
Qatar 1971 2012
Rumania 1989 1989 1 Rumania 1946 2012
Russia (Soviet Union) 1946 2017 44 Russia (Soviet Union) 1946 2012
Rwanda 1990 2016 17 Rwanda 1962 2012
Saudi Arabia 1979 1979 1 Saudi Arabia 1946 2012
Senegal 1990 2011 10 Senegal 1960 2012
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 1991 1999 5 Serbia 2006 2012
Yugoslavia (Serbia) 1946 2006
Sierra Leone 1991 2001 11 Sierra Leone 1961 2012
Singapore 1965 2012
Slovakia 1993 2012
Slovenia 1992 2012
Solomon Islands 1978 2012
Somalia 1964 2017 32 Somalia 1960 2012
South Africa 1966 1988 30 South Africa 1946 2012
South Korea 1949 1953 5 South Korea 1948 2012
South Sudan 2011 2017 9 South Sudan 2011 2012
Spain 1957 1991 11 Spain 1946 2012
Sri Lanka 1971 2009 27 Sri Lanka 1948 2012
Sudan 1963 2017 49 Sudan 1956 2012
Suriname 1987 1987 1 Surinam 1975 2012
Swaziland 1968 2012
Sweden 1946 2012
Switzerland 1946 2012
Syria 1948 2017 27 Syria 1946 2012
Taiwan 1949 1958 4 Taiwan 1949 2012
Tajikistan 1992 2011 10 Tajikistan 1991 2012
Tanzania 1978 1978 2 Tanzania/Tanganyika 1961 2012
Thailand 1946 2017 32 Thailand 1946 2012
Tibet 1946 1950
Togo 1986 1986 1 Togo 1960 2012
Trinidad and Tobago 1990 1990 1 Trinidad and Tobago 1962 2012
Tunisia 1961 2016 3 Tunisia 1956 2012
Turkey 1974 2017 41 Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1946 2012
Turkmenistan 1991 2012
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B Appendix Chapter 2
B.1 Data Adjustments
When merging economic data with policy variables such as conflict, good care has to be
taken to not loose observations due to country naming inconsistencies (see Boese & Kamin
(2019) for an extensive discussion). The following country names from the conflict data
where adapted to the country names in the trade data to make them compatible: “Bosnia-
Herzegovina” in “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, “Cambodia (Kampuchea)” in “Cambodia”,
“DR Congo (Zaire)” in “Congo, Dem. Rep.”, “Ivory Coast” in “Cote d’Ivoire”, “Korea”
in “Korea, Rep.”, “Kyrgyzstan” in “Kyrgyz Republic”, “Laos” in “Lao PDR”, “Mace-
donia” in “Macedonia (FYR)”, “Madagascar (Malagasy)” in “Madagascar”, “Myanmar
(Burma)” in “Myanmar”, “Russia” in “Russian Federation”, “Slovakia” in “Slovak Repub-
lic”, “Syria” in “Syrian Arab Republic”, “United States of America” in “United States”,
“Yemen (North Yemen)” in “Yemen”, “Serbia (Yugoslavia)” in “Yugoslavia”, “Zimbabwe
(Rhodesia)” in “Zimbabwe”. A special case is Ethiopia: As location, “Ethiopia” is coded
since 1992 in the conflict data, “Eritrea” since 1997. In the trade data “Eritrea” is coded
since 1993, “Ethiopia (incl. Eritrea)” only in 1992, “Ethiopia (excl. Eritrea)” since 1993.
UCDP coincides with the list of UN member states where Eritrea is only coded from 1993
on. Hence, for 1992 Ethiopia was renamed “Ethiopia (incl. Eritrea)” and from 1993 on
“Ethiopia (excl. Eritrea)” in accordance with the trade data. Within the trade data an-
other pitfall in country naming has to be addressed: “Czechoslovakia” exists in the trade
data only for the year 1992. From 1993 on the country is divided in “Czech Republic”
and “Slovak Republic”. Since there are no conflict observations for these countries in
these years, the naming remained as is. Furthermore, the internal armed conflict in South
Sudan in 2011 and the internationalized internal armed conflict in Lesotho in 1998 are
not included due to missing trade data.
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B.2 Alternative Specifications / Robustness Checks
Estimation of ols with country-time fixed effects
ln(Xij,t) = β0 + β1conflictij,t + β2locationij,t + β3neighborij,t
+β4bothij,t + β5enemyij,t + β6log(distij,t) + β7ptaij,t
+β8contiguityij + β9comlangij + β10colonyij + β11comcolij
+ωi,t + ρj,t + ij,t
(6)
where i and j denote exporter and importer country, t denotes time, and the other vari-
ables are defined as:
Xij,t is the logged total trade value exported from origin i to destination j at time t;
conflictij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been involved in the respective conflict
at time t;
locationij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been location of the respective conflict at
time t;
neighborij,t is a dummy being unity if the neighbor of i or j has been involved in a conflict
at time t;
bothij,t is a dummy being unity if both, i and j, have been involved in the respective con-
flict at time t;
enemyij,t is a dummy being unity if i and j have been enemies in the respective conflict
at time t;
distij,t is measuring the population-weighted distance between i and j at time t;
ptaij,t is a dummy variable being unity if a preferential trade agreement exists at time t;
contiguityij is a dummy variable being unity if i and j share a common border;
comlangij is a dummy variable being unity if i and j have a common official language;
colonyij is a dummy variable being unity for pairs that have had a colonial relationship
in the past;
comcolij is a dummy variable being unity for having a common colonizer past 1945;
ωi,t and ρj,t represent the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects;
ij,t is the error term, taking up all other influences on dyadic trade.
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Estimation of ols with high-dimensional fixed effects
ln(Xij,t) = β0 + β1conflictij,t + β2locationij,t + β3neighborij,t + β4bothij,t+
β5enemyij,t + β9log(distij,t) + β10ptaij,t + ωi,t + ρj,t + µij + ij,t
(7)
where i and j denote exporter and importer country, t denotes time, and the other vari-
ables are defined as:
ln(Xij,t) is the logged total trade value exported from origin i to destination j at time t;
conflictij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been involved in the respective conflict
at time t;
locationij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been location of the respective conflict at
time t;
neighborij,t is a dummy being unity if the neighbor of i or j has been involved in a conflict
at time t;
bothij,t is a dummy being unity if both, i and j, have been involved in the respective con-
flict at time t;
enemyij,t is a dummy being unity if i and j have been enemies in the respective conflict
at time t;
distij,t is measuring the population-weighted distance between i and j at time t;
ptaij,t is a dummy variable being unity if a preferential trade agreement exists at time t;
ωi,t and j,t represent the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects;
µij are the country-pair fixed effects, and
ij,t is the error term, taking up all other influences on dyadic trade.
Estimation of ppml with country-time fixed effects
Xij,t = exp
[
β1conflictij,t + β2locationij,t + β3neighborij,t + β4bothij,t+
β5enemyij,t + β6log(distij,t) + β7ptaij,t + β8contiguityij
+β9comlangij + β10colonyij + β11comcolij + ωi,t + ρj,t
]
+ij,t
(8)
where i and j denote exporter and importer country, t denotes time, and the other vari-
ables are defined as:
Xij,t is the total trade value exported from origin i to destination j at time t;
conflictij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been involved in the respective conflict
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at time t;
locationij,t is a dummy being unity if i or j have been location of the respective conflict at
time t;
neighborij,t is a dummy being unity if the neighbor of i or j has been involved in a conflict
at time t;
bothij,t is a dummy being unity if both, i and j, have been involved in the respective con-
flict at time t;
enemyij,t is a dummy being unity if i and j have been enemies in the respective conflict
at time t;
distij,t is measuring the population-weighted distance between i and j at time t;
ptaij,t is a dummy variable being unity if a preferential trade agreement exists at time t;
contiguityij is a dummy variable being unity if i and j share a common border;
comlangij is a dummy variable being unity if i and j have a common official language;
colonyij is a dummy variable being unity for pairs that have had a colonial relationship
in the past;
comcolij is a dummy variable being unity for having a common colonizer past 1945;
ωi,t and ρj,t represent the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects;
ij,t is the error term, taking up all other influences on dyadic trade.
B.3 Results from all specifications, (1)-(4), per conflict type
Table 20: Summary statistics for variables only used in the other specifications
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Exports)+1 417,211 7.349204 4.245883 0 30.33898
Contiguity 408,651 .021708 .1457286 0 1
Common official language 408,651 .161184 .367701 0 1
Colony 408,651 .0178294 .1323312 0 1
Common colonizer 408,651 .0959719 .294553 0 1
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B.4 Country list of countries included in the analysis
Table 26: Country list, (A-F)
Afghanistan Central African Republic
Albania Chad
Algeria Chile
American Samoa China
Andorra Christmas Island
Angola Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Anguila Colombia
Antigua and Barbuda Comoros
Argentina Congo
Armenia Congo, Dem. Rep.
Aruba Cook Islands
Australia Costa Rica
Austria Cote d’Ivoire
Azerbaijan Croatia
Bahamas, The Cuba
Bahrain Cyprus
Bangladesh Czech Republic
Barbados Czechoslovakia
Belarus Denmark
Belgium Djibouti
Belgium-Luxembourg Dominica
Belize Dominican Republic
Benin East Timor
Bermuda Ecuador
Bhutan Egypt
Bolivia El Salvador
Bosnia and Herzegovina Equatorial Guinea
Botswana Eritrea
Br. Antr. Terr Estonia
Brazil Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea)
British Indian Ocean Ter. Ethiopia(includes Eritrea)
British Virgin Islands Faeroe Islands
Brunei Falkland Island
Bulgaria Fiji
Burkina Faso Finland
Burundi Fr. So. Ant. Tr
Cambodia France
Cameroon Free Zones
Canada French Guiana
Cape Verde French Polynesia
Cayman Islands
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Table 27: Country list, (G-Q)
Gabon Macedonia (FYR)
Gambia, The Madagascar
Georgia Malawi
Germany Malaysia
Ghana Maldives
Gibraltar Mali
Greece Malta
Greenland Marshall Islands
Grenada Martinique
Guadeloupe Mauritania
Guam Mauritius
Guatemala Mexico
Guinea Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Guinea-Bissau Moldova
Guyana Monaco
Haiti Mongolia
Holy See Montserrat
Honduras Morocco
Hong Kong, China Mozambique
Hungary Myanmar
Iceland Namibia
India Nauru
Indonesia Nepal
Iran Netherlands
Iraq Netherlands Antilles
Ireland Neutral Zone
Israel New Caledonia
Italy New Zealand
Jamaica Nicaragua
Japan Niger
Jordan Nigeria
Kazakhstan Niue
Kenya Norfolk Island
Kiribati Northern Mariana Islands
Korea, Dem. Rep. Norway
Korea, Rep. Oman
Kuwait Pakistan
Kyrgyz Republic Palau
Lao PDR Panama
Latvia Papua New Guinea
Lebanon Paraguay
Lesotho Peru
Liberia Philippines
Libya Pitcairn
Lithuania Poland
Luxembourg Portugal
Macao Qatar
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Table 28: Country list, (R-Z)
Reunion Syrian Arab Republic
Romania Tajikistan
Russian Federation Tanzania
Rwanda Thailand
Saint Helena Togo
Saint Pierre and Miquelon Tokelau
Samoa Tonga
San Marino Trinidad and Tobago
Sao Tome and Principe Tunisia
Saudi Arabia Turkey
Senegal Turkmenistan
Seychelles Turks and Caicos Isl.
Sierra Leone Tuvalu
Singapore Uganda
Slovak Republic Ukraine
Slovenia United Arab Emirates
Solomon Islands United Kingdom
Somalia United States
South Africa Uruguay
South Sudan Us Msc.Pac.I
Spain Uzbekistan
Sri Lanka Vanuatu
St. Kitts and Nevis Venezuela
St. Lucia Vietnam
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Wallis and Futura Isl.
Sudan Western Sahara
Suriname Yemen
Swaziland Yugoslavia
Sweden Zambia
Switzerland Zimbabwe
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B.5 Country involvement per conflict type
Table 29: Countries involved in an interstate armed conflict.
Country First year Last Year N Location
Australia 2003 2003 166
Cambodia 2011 2011 113 Yes
Cameroon 1996 1996 93 Yes
Djibouti 2008 2008 87 Yes
Ecuador 1995 1995 101 Yes
Eritrea 1998 2008 201 Yes
Ethiopia (excluding Eritrea) 1998 2000 417 Yes
India 1992 2003 1339 Yes
Iraq 2003 2003 77 Yes
Nigeria 1996 1996 105 Yes
Pakistan 1992 2003 1276 Yes
Peru 1995 1995 102 Yes
Thailand 2011 2011 136 Yes
United Kingdom 2003 2003 168
United States 2003 2003 170
Total 1992 2011 4551 80%
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year). Location indicates whether
the country was the location of the conflict. The percentage indicates the fraction of
countries that were location of an interstate armed conflict.
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Table 30: Countries involved in an internal armed conflict, (A-N).
Country First year Last year N
Afghanistan 1992 2000 754
Algeria 1992 2011 1863
Angola 1992 2009 734
Azerbaijan 1993 1995 132
Bangladesh 2005 2006 293
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993 1995 122
Burundi 1992 2008 926
Cambodia 1992 1998 430
Central African Republic 2002 2011 344
Chad 1992 2010 1057
China 2008 2008 162
Colombia 1992 2011 2658
Comoros 1997 1997 47
Congo 1993 1993 54
Cote d’Ivoire 2002 2011 473
Croatia 1995 1995 73
Djibouti 1992 1999 162
Egypt 1993 1998 676
Eritrea 1997 2003 133
Georgia 1992 2004 185
Guatemala 1992 1995 364
Guinea 2000 2001 203
Haiti 2004 2004 92
India 1992 2011 2967
Indonesia 1992 2005 1518
Iran 1992 2011 1900
Iraq 1992 1996 207
Israel 1992 2011 2561
Liberia 2000 2003 346
Libya 2011 2011 85
Macedonia (FYR) 2001 2001 76
Mali 1994 2009 413
Mauritania 2011 2011 104
Mexico 1994 1996 232
Moldova 1992 1992 30
Mozambique 1992 1992 60
Myanmar 1992 2011 1874
Nepal 1996 2006 1033
Niger 1992 2008 440
Nigeria 2004 2011 388
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year).
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Table 31: Countries involved in an internal armed conflict, (P-Y).
Country First year Last year N
Pakistan 1994 2011 1440
Papua New Guinea 1992 1996 254
Peru 1992 2010 1413
Philippines 1992 2011 2729
Russian Federation 1993 2011 2430
Rwanda 1992 2002 499
Senegal 1992 2011 857
Sierra Leone 2001 2001 92
Somalia 1992 2002 379
Sri Lanka 1992 2009 2168
Sudan 1992 2011 1931
Syrian Arab Republic 2011 2011 120
Tajikistan 1992 2011 389
Thailand 2003 2011 1437
Turkey 1992 2011 2868
Uganda 1992 2007 1304
United Kingdom 1998 1998 143
Uzbekistan 1999 2004 172
Venezuela 1992 1992 88
Yemen 1994 1994 56
Total 1992 2011 46940
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year).
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Table 32: Countries involved in an internationalized internal armed conflict, (A-L).
Country First year Last year N Location
Afghanistan 2001 2011 1235 Yes
Albania 2004 2011 918
Algeria 2004 2004 120 Yes
Angola 1997 2002 424 Yes
Armenia 1992 2011 620
Australia 2001 2011 1765
Austria 2006 2011 761
Azerbaijan 1992 2011 850 Yes
Belgium 1999 2011 1416
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 2011 871 Yes
Bulgaria 2004 2011 1177
Canada 1999 2011 1918
Central African 2001 2011 430 Yes
Chad 1997 2004 333
Congo 1997 2002 344 Yes
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1996 2001 6 Yes
Croatia 1992 2011 969 Yes
Czech Republic 1999 2011 1304
Denmark 1999 2011 1752
Dominican Republic 2004 2004 119
El Salvador 2004 2011 843
Estonia 2004 2011 978
Finland 2006 2011 912
France 1999 2011 1942
Georgia 2004 2011 983 Yes
Germany 1999 2011 1939
Ghana 1999 1999 106
Greece 1999 2011 1185
Guinea 1992 1999 570
Guinea-Bissau 1998 1999 72 Yes
Honduras 2004 2004 125
Hungary 1999 2011 1031
Iceland 1999 2011 965
Iraq 2004 2011 694 Yes
Ireland 2006 2011 763
Italy 1999 2011 1937
Japan 2001 2002 337
Jordan 2001 2011 799
Kazakhstan 2004 2008 500
Kenya 2011 2011 128
Kuwait 2005 2005 124
Kyrgyz Republic 2000 2000 69
Latvia 2004 2011 971
Libya 2001 2001 92
Lithuania 2002 2011 1247
Luxembourg 1999 2011 902
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year). Location indicates whether
the country was the location of the conflict.
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Table 33: Countries involved in an internationalized internal armed conflict, (M-Z).
Country First year Last year N Location
Macedonia (FYR) 2004 2011 768
Malaysia 2010 2011 287
Mali 1999 2004 204
Mauritania 2010 2010 112 Yes
Moldova 2004 2008 481
Mongolia 2004 2011 618
Namibia 2000 2002 303
Netherlands 1999 2011 1928
New Zealand 2002 2011 1244
Nicaragua 2004 2004 105
Niger 2004 2004 89
Nigeria 1992 1999 779
Norway 1999 2011 1706
Pakistan 2002 2009 1279
Philippines 2004 2004 160
Poland 1999 2011 1826
Portugal 1999 2011 1360
Romania 2002 2011 1445
Russian Federation 1993 2008 768
Rwanda 1996 2011 555 Yes
Saudi Arabia 2004 2007 613
Senegal 1998 1999 190
Sierra Leone 1992 2000 579 Yes
Singapore 2009 2011 445
Slovak Republic 2003 2011 1206
Slovenia 2006 2011 823
Somalia 2006 2011 456 Yes
South Africa 1998 1998 138
Spain 1999 2011 1754
Sudan 2003 2011 702 Yes
Sweden 2006 2011 937
Switzerland 2006 2007 334
Tajikistan 1993 1996 185 Yes
Tonga 2004 2011 183
Turkey 1999 2011 1387
Uganda 1997 2011 941 Yes
Ukraine 2004 2011 881
United Arab Emirates 2009 2011 442
United Kingdom 1999 2011 2104
United States 1999 2011 1950
Uzbekistan 1993 2000 171 Yes
Yemen 2009 2011 284 Yes
Yugoslavia 1999 1999 116 Yes
Zimbabwe 1998 2001 460
Total 1992 2011 70844 24,4%
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year). Location indicates whether
the country was the location of the conflict. The percentage indicates the fraction of
countries that were location of an internationalized internal armed conflict.
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Table 34: Countries which are involved in a non-state conflict, (A-R).
Country First year Last year N
Afghanistan 1992 2011 1052
Algeria 1995 1998 264
Bangladesh 1993 2001 372
Bolivia 2000 2000 94
Brazil 1994 2011 1483
Burundi 1997 2007 340
Cameroon 1992 1998 314
Canada 1995 1998 274
Central African Republic 2011 2011 81
Chad 1999 2007 292
China 2009 2009 158
Colombia 1993 2005 1350
Comoros 1998 1998 50
Cote d’Ivoire 1995 2011 815
Djibouti 1995 1995 45
Ecuador 2003 2003 135
Egypt 2011 2011 131
Georgia 1997 1998 150
Ghana 1992 2008 736
Guatemala 2005 2008 265
Guinea 2000 2011 200
Honduras 2010 2010 125
India 1992 2011 2163
Indonesia 1997 2001 610
Iraq 1992 2007 668
Israel 2006 2007 293
Jamaica 2001 2001 129
Kenya 1992 2011 2199
Kyrgyz Republic 2010 2010 87
Lebanon 1992 2008 845
Liberia 1992 1996 289
Madagascar 2002 2009 237
Mali 1994 1999 231
Mexico 1993 2011 1275
Myanmar 1995 2007 650
Nepal 2007 2007 118
Niger 1997 1997 64
Nigeria 1992 2011 2249
Pakistan 1992 2011 1454
Papua New Guinea 1999 2001 151
Philippines 1993 2011 670
Russian Federation 1994 1994 107
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year).
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Table 35: Countries involved in a non-state conflict, (S-Y).
Country First year Last year N
Senegal 2006 2006 125
Sierra Leone 1994 1995 116
Somalia 1992 2011 1217
South Africa 1992 1998 696
Sri Lanka 1994 2006 567
Sudan 1992 2011 2046
Syrian Arab Repu 2011 2011 120
Tajikistan 1992 1992 25
Tanzania 1997 1997 90
Thailand 1996 1996 134
Turkey 1997 1997 139
Uganda 1998 2009 1091
Yemen 2004 2010 204
Total 1992 2011 29785
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year).
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Table 36: Countries involved in one-sided violence, (A-M).
Country First year Last year N
Afghanistan 1997 2011 1403
Algeria 1993 2009 1121
Angola 1993 2003 653
Azerbaijan 1992 1992 25
Bahrain 2011 2011 105
Bangladesh 1992 2004 838
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 1995 151
Brazil 1993 2005 269
Burundi 1994 2006 815
Cambodia 1992 1998 357
Cameroon 1994 1994 76
Central African Republic 2001 2011 609
Chad 1992 2007 748
China 2008 2008 162
Colombia 1993 2010 2284
Congo 1993 2002 398
Cote d’Ivoire 1993 2011 839
Croatia 1993 1995 127
Egypt 1995 2005 672
Georgia 1993 1995 95
Guatemala 1992 2011 480
Guinea 1996 2009 565
Guyana 2008 2008 99
Haiti 1993 2005 187
Honduras 2004 2004 125
India 1992 2011 2967
Indonesia 1992 2004 1481
Iran 2009 2009 145
Iraq 1992 2011 965
Israel 1994 2006 1068
Jordan 1992 2005 210
Kenya 2007 2011 561
Lebanon 1994 2006 343
Liberia 1992 2003 712
Libya 2011 2011 85
Madagascar 2009 2009 124
Mali 1992 2009 232
Mauritania 2009 2009 116
Mexico 1997 2011 414
Morocco 2003 2003 146
Mozambique 1992 1992 60
Myanmar 1992 2011 1691
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year).
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Table 37: Countries involved in one-sided violence, (N-Z).
Country First year Last year N
Namibia 2000 2002 207
Nepal 1996 2006 951
Niger 1995 1998 132
Nigeria 1994 2011 1475
Pakistan 1998 2011 1521
Papua New Guinea 1992 1996 113
Peru 1992 1993 173
Philippines 1995 2009 1030
Russian Federation 1995 2011 1453
Rwanda 1992 2009 433
Saudi Arabia 2003 2004 306
Senegal 1992 2002 501
Sierra Leone 1992 2002 683
Somalia 1992 2011 407
South Africa 1992 1994 299
Spain 2004 2004 166
Sri Lanka 1992 2009 1479
Sudan 1992 2011 2046
Syrian Arab Republic 2011 2011 120
Tajikistan 1992 1992 25
Tanzania 2001 2007 247
Thailand 1995 2011 1859
Togo 1993 2005 145
Turkey 1992 1999 713
Uganda 1995 2010 1538
United Kingdom 1993 2005 274
United States 2001 2001 170
Yemen 2011 2011 86
Zambia 1993 2000 148
Zimbabwe 2008 2008 122
Total 1992 2011 43345
N indicates the total number of involvements (country-year).
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B.6 Enmity per dyad and year
Table 38: Countries that are enemies in an interstate armed conflict, by year.
year
Pakistan India 1992
Peru Ecuador 1995
Nigeria Cameroon 1996
Pakistan India 1996
Pakistan India 1997
India Pakistan 1998
Pakistan India 1999
India Pakistan 2000
Pakistan India 2001
India Pakistan 2002
United Kingdom Iraq 2003
United States Iraq 2003
Australia Iraq 2003
India Pakistan 2003
Thailand Cambodia 2011
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Table 39: Countries that are enemies in an internationalized internal armed conflict, by
year.
year
Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993
Guinea Nigeria 1997
Guinea Sierra Leone 1997
Nigeria Sierra Leone 1997
Rwanda Angola 1998
Rwanda Chad 1998
Guinea Nigeria 1998
Guinea Sierra Leone 1998
Nigeria Sierra Leone 1998
Rwanda Zimbabwe 1998
Uganda Zimbabwe 1998
Rwanda Zimbabwe 1999
Uganda Zimbabwe 1999
Uganda Namibia 2000
Uganda Zimbabwe 2000
Australia Afghanistan 2001
France Afghanistan 2001
Canada Afghanistan 2001
Italy Afghanistan 2001
Netherlands Afghanistan 2001
United Kingdom Afghanistan 2001
Jordan Afghanistan 2001
United States Afghanistan 2001
Turkey Afghanistan 2001
Russian Federation Afghanistan 2001
Germany Afghanistan 2001
Poland Afghanistan 2001
Japan Afghanistan 2001
Rwanda Angola 2001
Rwanda Namibia 2001
Rwanda Zimbabwe 2001
Russian Federation Georgia 2008
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C Appendix Chapter 3
C.1 List of countries and regions included in the analysis
Table 40: Countries and regions included in the analysis
region country
Latin America Argentina , Bolivia , Chile, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Middle East & North Africa Algeria, Iran, Morocco, Turkey
Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal,
South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda
Western Europe, Australia & North America Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, United States of America
Asia China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Thailand
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C.2 Regional Impulse Response Functions
The regional impulse response functions were computed as follows: In a first step the
VAR-model is estimated separately for each country. This has the advantage of allowing
for heterogeneous slope parameters across countries (as opposed to estimating a panel
model with fixed effects). Secondly, for each country the given Cholesky-decomposition is
employed and impulse response functions are calculated. Third, regional impulse response
functions are derived by taking the average of the corresponding countries’ point esti-
mates. Confidence bands, however, may not be pooled accross countries by using averages
since they are based on non-linear quantiles. Averages over confidence bands would yield
unclear coverage, i.e. it would be unclear whether the confidence bands coverage retains
its nominal size of 95%. Regional confidence bands are therefore computed employing the
following variance decomposition:
For each forecasting step (s = 1, 2, ..., 10) the regional variance that consists of within and
between variance:
σ2s,regional = σ
2
s,within + σ
2
s,between, (9)
with
σ2s,within =
1
N
N∑
i=1
variancei,s,
where i = 1, 2, ..., N is the number of countries in the regional group and variancei,s =
standarderror2i,s · τ . τ refers to the degrees of freedom adjusted lengths of each country’s
timeseries, i.e. τ = T − L− L ∗K − 1, where T = 57 years, lag length L = 4, number of
control variables K = 4, and −1 for the intercept. Therefore, τ = 57− 4− 4 ∗ 4− 1 = 36.
For the regional between variance the heterogeneity of the point estimates is exploited. It
is computed using the folllowing formula:
σ2s,between =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[IRFi,s − 1
N
N∑
i=1
IRFi,s]
2
where IRFi,s are the point estimates obtained for each step s = 1, 2, ..., 10 and each coun-
try i in the region (N =total number of countries in the region).
Once σ2s,regional is computed regional confidence bands for each step can be calculated as
upper (lower) 95%: IRFs+(−) σ2s,regional ·1, 96, where IRFs is the simple regional average
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of the point estimates.
Since the heterogeneity of responses is substantial across countries the regionally aggre-
gated impulse response functions in Figure 4 display no effect. Note that this result is
solely driven by the regional heterogeneity of effects, not by their inexistence.
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Figure 4: Regional impulse response functions for Asia.
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”ac” stands for ”armed conflict”, ”dev” for development, and ”dem” for democracy
C.3 Impulse Response Functions - Baseline Model
This section displays and discusses the impulse response function of the baseline model:
VAR(4), ordering: Development, democracy, conflict and trade.
For the sake of space only impulse response functions for countries with significant effects
are shown. The impulse response functions are grouped by bilateral relationship.
Trade openness and development
Trade openness seems to have a negative effect on development only in a handful of coun-
tries. However, in these countries the effect is strong and persistent. Affected countries are
exclusively African or Latin American. Nevertheless, the largest positive impacts of trade
openness on development can as well be seen in Africa: The biggest effect is displayed
by Ivory Coast. Smaller, but significant positive results are seen for Asian countries. In-
terestingly, the largest advocate for free trade profits from it: The US show a significant
development effect from a positive shock in trade openness.
Development only has a negative result for three countries: Central African Republic,
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Nicaragua and Uruguay, with the biggest effect for Nicaragua. In turn, development has
a positive effect on trade openness for a huge number of countries: Across all regions
countries trade openness is affected positively by a positive shock in development, with
the largest impacts in Rwanda and Suriname, followed by the US, Algeria, Republic of
the Congo and Senegal.
Summary: Development causes rise in trade openness in a large number of countries, while
negative effects are rare. Trade openness does not necessarily cause rise in development:
Positive effects are rarely large. However, the same applies to negative effects of trade
openness.
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Figure 5: IRF: Positive effects of trade on development.
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Figure 6: IRF: negative effects of trade on development.
-.4
-.2
0
.2
-.4
-.2
0
.2
0 5 10 0 5 10 0 5 10
Central African Republic Chile Democratic Republic of Congo
Madagascar Mexico Nicaragua
Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function, tradedev
Lower confidence band
Upper confidence band
step
Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of trade on de-
velopment during at least one step.
121
Figure 7: IRF: positive effects of development on trade.
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Figure 8: IRF: negative effects of development on trade
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Trade openness and democracy
The highest positive effects of a shock in trade openness on democracy can be seen in
Chile and Turkey. Especially Latin American countries display positive responses. While
only 9 countries show positive results, 19 countries show negative responses in democracy
after a positive shock in trade openness. This group is very heterogeneous and represents
all 5 regions. Negative results are largest for Republic of Congo, South Korea and Niger.
Compared to the results seen before, responses for each direction are more balanced in this
group. Trade openness is negatively affected by a shock in democracy in 15 countries of all
regions, most notably Rwanda and Iran. Interestingly, especially China’s trade openness
profits from positive shocks in democracy. Other substantial effects of democracy on trade
can be seen for Suriname, Republic of the Congo and Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Summary: The responses to a shock are heterogeneous in both parts of the bilateral rela-
tionship between trade openness and democracy.
Figure 9: IRF: positive effects of trade on democracy.
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Figure 10: IRF: negative effects of trade on democracy.
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Figure 11: IRF: positive effects of democracy on trade.
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Figure 12: IRF: negative effects of democracy on trade.
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Trade openness and conflict
Overall a shock in trade openness leads to very heterogeneous responses across all coun-
tries. Interestingly, for this shock regional homogeneity is present to some extent. Four
western states out of 13 countries show a positive response in armed conflict to a shock in
trade. In Latin America, the only significant effects are negative deviations (of substantial
magnitude, e.g. Nicaragua -.2) from the country means in 3 of 10 countries. All other
regions contain countries with heterogeneous responses, which suggest conflict location as
a potentially important variable to include in further research.
Overall, as well as in the reverse case, the responses of trade openness to a shock in armed
conflict are heterogeneous across countries and regions. From the MENA region, only
one country displays a significant response, which is Turkey, and the response is positive.
However, no general result for this relationship can be stated.
Summary: Trade and conflict simultaneously affect each other. The effects are heteroge-
neous across countries, although there is some slight regional homogeneity.
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Figure 13: IRF: positive effects of trade on conflict.
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Figure 14: IRF: negative effects of trade on conflict.
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Democracy and development
In line with the slow moving and slow reacting nature of the two variables, democracy and
development, observed effects of democracy on development mostly appear after 5 periods
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Figure 15: IRF: positive effects of conflict on trade.
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Figure 16: IRF: negative effects of conflict on trade.
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(i.e. in the long run) and they are long lasting (e.g. Ghana, Gabon, CAR, Senegal), that
is they last for several periods in a row. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 of 21 countries show
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significant responses and all of them are positive. In Asia, only Sri Lanka shows an effect
(positive between periods 4-9) In Western States 2 of 19 countries show a positive effect.
Here, the effect is short (one or at most two periods) and occurs right after the shock
(or within the first 5 periods). No effect is visible in any MENA country. On average
democracy has mostly positive effects on development in this sample, if any. Over all re-
gions the only countries which show a negative effect are three countries in Latin America.
(Chile, Honduras and Mexico). These display long lasting negative effects of democracy
on development.
The IRFs mostly provide evidence for positive effects of development on the level of
democracy. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Western States the significant effects were en-
tirely positive. However, there are two notable negative responses: In Indonesia a shock
in development leads to a very strong negative response (up to -3 deviation from its coun-
try mean and over the first 7 periods). In Argentina, democracy also responds negatively
(with deviations from its democracy average of up to -4.5 points) during periods 2 to 6.
Morocco is an interesting case as there, democracy first responds negatively to a shock in
development, but then adjusts and responds positively in periods 7-9. It is worth noting,
though, that Morocco’s response is rather small in magnitude, i.e. its democracy value
never deviates more than +/-.3 from its average.
Summary: In total the impulse response functions point towards mutual positive effects of
democracy on development and vice versa. There are, however, a few notable exceptions
where negative responses occur. Due to the magnitude of these responses they should not
be overlooked.
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Figure 17: IRF: Positive effects of development on democracy.
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Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of development
on democracy during at least one step.
Figure 18: IRF: Negative effects of development on democracy.
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Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of development
on democracy during at least one step.
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Figure 19: IRF: Positive effects of democracy on development.
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Figure 20: IRF: Negative effects of democracy on development.
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Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of democracy on
development during at least one step.
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Conflict and development
There are comparatively few countries in which a shock of armed conflict has significant
effects on development. None of the countries in the MENA region, for example, show
any significant effect. When there are effects they are mostly positive and appear only
after 5 periods (for example in Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay). In Sub-Saharan Africa
this pattern is particularly pronounced for the Republic of Congo and Rwanda. In the
Central African Republic on the other hand, conflict has a strong negative impact over the
last three periods. Interestingly, the only country with a similar pattern is Austria. The
Netherlands are a notable case as a shock in conflict there leads to up to +.18 positive
deviation from its country average in development. In this model, both armed conflict and
democracy have mostly positive effects on development. The magnitude of these effects is
higher after shocks in democracy than in armed conflict.
Development has comparatively smaller effects on armed conflict than democracy, i.e. the
responses are on average of a smaller magnitude (most of the countries deviate less than
.1 points from their conflict average over the entire 10 periods) and they occur in a smaller
number of countries. In several countries a positive shock in development leads to a posi-
tive response of armed conflict. In Western states this effect is very short lived and only
visible in the first period. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Sudan are most notable examples: Their conflict values deviate around +0.12
over at least two periods after a positive shock in development. There are 7 countries for
which a positive shock in development leads to a negative deviation from their country
means in armed conflict. Once more conflict location suggests itself as an important factor
to include in further research especially regarding the effects of conflict.
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Figure 21: IRF: Positive effects of conflict on development.
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Figure 22: IRF: Negative effects of conflict on development.
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Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of conflict on
development during at least one step.
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Figure 23: IRF: Positive effects of development on conflict.
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Figure 24: IRF: Negative effects of development on conflict.
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133
Democracy and conflict
The effects of armed conflict on democracy are very heterogeneous across countries, in
terms of magnitude as well as timing. There are positive and negative responses across
all regions. Significant responses occur at all steps. There is no striking similarity or dif-
ference. The positive impact of armed conflict on democratization is especially striking in
Central America: Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama display some of the largest significant
results in the whole shock group, while results for regions 4, 5, and 6 show mixed results.
In region 2, Turkey is the only country showing a significant result, which as well as in
Central America shows that armed conflict increases democratization. Overall, timing of
these shocks is very diverse.
The effects of a shock in democracy on conflict are highly heterogeneous across countries.
For example, there is a significant negative effect at some point in the first five years in
all MENA countries, particularly strong in Iran A strong significant positive effect on the
other hand is visible in India and Malaysia within the first five periods. These are the only
countries in Asia displaying any response. In general most reactions seem to happen in
the first five periods. Responses after that mostly occur in Western States (Australia) or
are very small (e.g. Togo or Suriname). Although some countries in region 5 show positive
results, these results are very small (Norway, Netherlands, Spain, UK). A striking but as
well intuitive result is that the biggest negative responses of armed conflict to a positive
shock in democratization are seen in the western countries (Australia, Canada, Portugal):
Conflict involvement decreases the more democratic a country becomes. The reverse is
true for regions 4 and 6, where a positive shock in democratization leads to more armed
Conflict.
Summary: The impulse response functions show evidence for both armed conflict affecting
democracy levels and vice -versa. In general the responses of democracy occur over longer
periods of time whereas conflict reacts rather punctually (few steps at a time). There
is evidence of simultaneity in a wide range of countries (e.g. Morocco: Democracy has a
negative impact on armed conflict and armed conflict has a negative impact on democracy;
or India and Malaysia where during the first five steps democracy has a positive effect on
armed conflict and so does armed conflict on democracy). This simultaneity can at times
take counter intuitive forms, e.g. in South Africa: Armed conflict has a negative effect
on democracy in the long run. In the short run democracy has a positive effect on armed
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conflict.
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Figure 25: IRF: Positive effects of conflict on democracy.
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Figure 26: IRF: Negative effects of conflict on democracy.
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Figure 27: IRF: Positive effects of democracy on conflict.
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Figure 28: IRF: Negative effects of democracy on conflict.
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C.4 Robustness Checks
On the following pages tables with the number of countries responding with positive,
negative or no changes to a given shock are presented for all model specification discussed
in Section 3.6:
1. VAR(4) model in first difference
2. VAR(4) model with alternative ordering (democracy, development, trade and con-
flict)
3. VAR(4) model with GDP per capita growth instead of female life expectancy
4. VAR(4) model with logged GDP per capita instead of female life expectancy
5. VAR(8) model
6. VAR(10) model
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C.5 Examining residual autocorrelation
Figure 35: VAR(4): Residual plots for countries with LM-test p-values between .01-.05
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Figure 36: VAR(4): Residual plots for countries with LM-test p-values below .01
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